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I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
1. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, et al., No. 12–515, 134 S. Ct. 
2024 (2014). State of Michigan brought an action to enjoin an Indian tribe from 
operating casino on land located outside its reservation that it had purchased with 
earnings from a congressionally established land trust.  The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction, and the tribe appealed.  The appellate court, 695 F.3d 406, 
vacated the injunction and remanded.  Certiorari was granted.  The Supreme Court, 
Justice Kagan, held that the suit was barred by tribal sovereign immunity.  Affirmed. 
II. OTHER COURTS 
A. Administrative Law 
2. California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Jewell, No. 11–00160, 2013 WL 
6524636, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2013). This matter was before the Court on cross 
motions for summary judgment.  Plaintiffs, led by Yakima Dixie, claim to be members of 
the California Valley Miwok Tribe (Tribe).  They challenged the August 31, 2011 final 
decision of Larry Echo Hawk, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) that reached the following conclusions:  (1) the Tribe is a federally recognized 
tribe; (2) the BIA cannot compel the Tribe to organize under the IRA and will cease all 
efforts to do so absent a request from the Tribe; (3) the BIA cannot compel the Tribe to 
expand its membership and will cease all efforts to do so absent a request from the 
Tribe; (4) as of the date of the Decision, the Tribe’s entire citizenship consisted of 
Yakima, Burley, Burley’s two daughters, and Burley’s granddaughter; and (5) the 
November 1998 Resolution established a General Council comprised of all of the adult 
citizens of the Tribe, with whom BIA may conduct government-to-government relations..  
Federal Defendants Sally Jewell, Secretary of the DOI, Michael Black, Director of BIA, 
and Larry Echo Hawk (collectively “the Federal Defendants”) opposed Plaintiffs’ motion 
and requested that the Court affirm the August 31, 2011 decision.         
  At the Court’s request, Intervenor–Defendant, another group of individuals who 
claimed to be members of the Tribe and who are led by Silvia Burley, filed a brief in 
support of the Federal Defendants’ summary judgment motion.  The Court concluded 
that the Assistant Secretary erred when he assumed that the Tribe’s membership is 
limited to five individuals and further assumed that the Tribe is governed by a duly 
constituted tribal council, thereby ignoring multiple administrative and court decisions 
that express concern about the nature of the Tribe’s governance.     
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The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that sought remand of 
the August 2011 Decision and denied the Federal Defendants’ cross motion for 
summary judgment.   
3. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Henriquez, No. CV–13–
01917, 2013 WL 6903750 (D. Ariz. 2013); 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq.; 25 C.F.R. § 2.6.	  
Before the court was defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The Chukchansi Indian Housing 
Authority (CIHA) is the housing entity of the Picayune Tribe of Chukchansi Indians 
(Tribe) established by tribal ordinance to operate the tribe’s federally assisted housing 
programs.  CIHA operates as a non-profit tribal corporation, governed by a Board of 
Commissioners appointed by the Tribal Council.  CIHA administers annual block grants 
from the Southwest Office of Native American Programs (SWONAP) of the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  The block grants are 
provided through the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination Act 
of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., which requires that grants be paid by 
HUD “directly to the recipient for the tribe.”  Individuals authorized to receive the funds 
are given access to an automated Line of Credit Control System (LOCCS), and can 
access and withdraw NAHASDA funds through that system.                                                                                 
In January 2013, a leadership dispute arose among the members of the Tribal 
Council, and various members of the Tribal Council attempted to suspend other 
members.  Three separate factions emerged from the leadership dispute, each claiming 
to represent the government of the Tribe.  The BIA advised HUD that the intra-tribal 
dispute was currently the subject of an appeal and that, pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 2.6, 
there was no final BIA determination regarding the appropriate tribal government.  As a 
result, HUD informed CIHA, with copy to the heads of all three factions that, “all current 
LOCCS users are hereby prohibited from accessing LOCCS.”  HUD emphasized that it 
was not suspending the Tribe’s funds, but rather revoking access to the LOCCS 
system, and that access by new users would be allowed if HUD became “satisfied that 
CIHA’s Board of Commissioners is in fact authorized and designated by a recognized 
Tribal government.”  CIHA initiated a suit against HUD, SWONAP, and their respective 
representatives on behalf of itself and the Tribe.                                                              
The suit asserted that:  (1) HUD suspended funds in violation of NAHASDA 
because it had not shown that CIHA failed to “comply substantially” with statutory 
requirements; (2) HUD’s suspension of funding violated the Administrative Procedures 
Act because it was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to applicable law; (3) HUD violated 
Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide proper 
notice or hearing prior to revoking CIHA’s access to LOCCS; (4) HUD violated federal 
common law by failing to acknowledge the elected tribal council at the last undisputed 
election; (5) Plaintiffs were entitled to declaratory relief regarding the recognition of tribal 
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court orders which recognized the Ayala faction as the lawful governing body of the 
Tribe; and (6) the government breached its fiduciary duty to the Tribe under NAHASDA.  
Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, 
seeking to have access to LOCCS restored “for the CIHA officials who had that access 
on and before August 22, 2013.”  Plaintiffs thus sought to have the Ayala faction 
granted exclusive access to the HUD funds.          
The court found that Plaintiffs could not meet the burden of showing their injury 
by Defendants’ actions. The Court also opined that Plaintiff's injury could not be 
redressed by a court order without asking the Court to resolve matters of intra-tribal 
governance. Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that they have standing to pursue this 
action.  The Court found Plaintiffs’ arguments and authorities unpersuasive, and elected 
to follow cases that have dismissed similar claims.         
The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.   
4. Alto v. Black, No. 12–56145, 738 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013).	  Descendants 
of Indian tribal members filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) order upholding the tribe’s decision to disenroll 
descendants from tribal membership.  After granting intervention by the tribe to file 
jurisdictional motions and after granting the descendants’ motion for preliminary 
injunction, preventing enforcement of the disenrollment order, pending completion of 
litigation, the District Court, 2012 WL 2152054, denied the tribe’s motion to dissolve the 
preliminary injunction and the tribe’s motions to dismiss, for failure to join the tribe as 
the required party and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Tribe appealed.  The 
appellate court held that:  (1) descendants’ challenges to disenrollment order were 
reviewable, and (2) tribe was not a required party.  Affirmed in part, dismissed in part, 
and remanded. 
5. Hester v. Jewell, No. 13–4142, 2014 WL 211868, __ Fed. Appx. __ (10th 
Cir. 2014).  Job applicant brought a pro se Title VII action against the Secretary of the 
Department of Interior (DOI) and Department officials.  The District Court, 2013 WL 
5322625, dismissed sua sponte, and the applicant appealed.  The appellate court held 
that the application of Indian Preference to job postings within the DOI was not racial 
discrimination under Title VII.  Affirmed. 
6. Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity v. United States Dep’t of Housing and 
Urban Dev., No. 11–CV–01516, 2014 WL 901511 (D. Colo. 2014). (From the opinion.)  
This action is one of several related actions pending in this court involving challenges to 
HUD’s reductions of the plaintiffs’ Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) awards pursuant 
to 24 C.F.R. § 1000.318 and HUD’s authority to recapture purported grant overfunding.  
The procedural history of the plaintiffs’ challenges to HUD’s elimination of Mutual Help 
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units from their Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) is described in this court’s 
Memorandum Opinion dated August 31, 2012 in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD et 
al., Civil Action No. 05–cv–00018–RPM, which was also made applicable in this civil 
action.  This action is unique because Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity (Nambe) filed this 
action in 2011, after the Native American Housing and Assistance and Self–
Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) was amended by the Native American Housing 
Assistance and Self–Determination Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–411, 
122 Stat. 4319 (the “Reauthorization Act”).          
The court found that HUD’s disallowance of FCAS funding for 23 units was 
arbitrary and capricious, explaining that those units could not have been conveyed to 
the homebuyers due to a title impediment created by the failure of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) to record a master lease for the projects where the units are located.  The 
court ruled that the amended version of NAHASDA governs this action because the 
agency actions challenged in this suit occurred after the effective date of the 2008 
amendments.   
The court also found and concluded that with respect to FCAS funding for FY 
2006, HUD lacked recapture authority because HUD did not “take action” within the 
3-year limitation provided by 24 C.F.R. § 1000.319.  It is FURTHER ORDERED that on 
or before April 15, 2014, Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing Entity shall submit a proposed 
form of judgment, specifying the amounts to be paid to it and the asserted sources of 
the payment; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff Nambe Pueblo Housing 
Entity claims entitlement to payment for underfunding because HUD excluded those 
units from its FCAS in a particular year, the proposed form of judgment should include a 
separate itemization for those amounts, which may be submitted by May 15, 2014.  The 
Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs will be addressed after entry of judgment. 
7. Tlingit-Haida Regional Housing Authority v. United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, No. 08–cv–00451, 2014 WL 
2781728 (D. Colo. Jun 19, 2014).  On March 4, 2008, Plaintiff Tlingit–Haida Regional 
Housing Authority (Tlingit–Haida or Tribe) filed an action for judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the Defendants 
(collectively “HUD”) violated the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., by reducing the 
number of housing units counted as Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) for the 
calculation of the Tribe’s share of the annual Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) and 
recapturing IHBG funds which the Tribe had received in past years for those units.  This 
action is governed by the version of NAHASDA that existed before it was amended by 
the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110–411, 122 Stat. 4319 (2008).         
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Legal issues common to this action and related actions were determined in two 
previous memorandum opinions and orders in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD et 
al., Civil Action No. 05–cv–00018–RPM, dated August 31, 2012, and March 7, 2014.    
Tlingit–Haida has established its right to an affirmative injunction requiring HUD 
to restore to it the amount of $1,139,658.  Final judgment was entered requiring the 
Defendants to restore to Plaintiff Tlingit–Haida Regional Housing Authority the amount 
of $1,139,658, for Indian Housing Block Grant funds that were illegally recaptured from 
the Plaintiff for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Any such restoration shall be in addition 
to the full IHBG allocation that would otherwise be due to the Plaintiff under the Native 
American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination Act (“NAHASDA”) in a given 
fiscal year as calculated without application of the amount of the Judgment.   
8. Choctaw Nation of Okla. v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban 
Dev., No. 08–cv-02577, 2014 WL 2883456 (D. Colo. 2014).  On November 25, 2008, 
Plaintiffs Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Housing Authority of the Choctaw Nation 
of Oklahoma (collectively, Choctaw or the Tribe) filed this action for judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the Defendants 
(collectively HUD) violated the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act of 1996 (“NAHASDA”), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., by reducing the 
number of housing units counted as Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) for the 
calculation of the Tribe’s share of the annual Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) and 
recapturing IHBG funds which the Tribe had received in past years.      
This action is governed by the version of NAHASDA that existed before it was 
amended by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–Determination 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–411, 122 Stat. 4319 (2008).  Legal issues 
common to this action and related actions were determined in two previous 
memorandum opinions and orders in Fort Peck Housing Authority v. HUD et al., Civil 
Action No. 05–cv–00018–RPM, dated August 31, 2012, and March 7, 2014.  Choctaw 
has established that it is entitled to restoration of the recaptured funds in the amount of 
$841,316.00.             
Defendants shall restore to Plaintiffs Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and Housing 
Authority of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (“Plaintiff Choctaw”) the amount of 
$841,316.00.  Any such restoration shall be in addition to the full IHBG allocation that 
would otherwise be due to Plaintiff Choctaw under the Native American Housing 
Assistance and Self–Determination Act (“NAHASDA”) in a given fiscal year as 
calculated without application of the amount of the Judgment.   
9. Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell, No.: 06–0969, 2014 WL 2885910 __ F. 
Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2014).  This case involved a challenge by certain Alaskan Native 
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Tribes (Tribes) to a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) 
regarding taking land into trust on behalf of all Indian Tribes, 25 C.F.R. § 151.1, 
pursuant to § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465.  Pending before the 
court was the State of Alaska’s (“Alaska”) Motion for a Stay and Injunction pending 
appeal of the Court’s September 30, 2013 Order in the D.C. Circuit.  The Court 
concluded on March 31, 2013, the Alaska exception within the rule was arbitrary and 
capricious and violated the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 476(g).    
The case is currently on appeal in the D.C. Circuit.  Meanwhile, on April 30, 
2014, the Bureau of Indian Affairs published a Proposed Rule, proposing to formally 
remove the Alaska exception from 25 C.F.R. § 151.1, and begin considering the 
acquisition of lands into trust on behalf of Alaska Native Tribes and individuals.  In this 
case, Alaska filed a motion for a Stay and Injunction pending appeal.  Alaska 
specifically asked this Court to stay its September 30, 2013 Order and to “enjoin the 
Secretary’s rulemaking activities, including accepting comments on the recently 
proposed rule, and enjoin the Secretary from accepting and processing applications to 
take land into trust for Alaska tribes, pending resolution of the appeal.”      
The court granted Alaska’s motion for stay and injunction pending appeal in part, 
denied in part, and enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from taking land into trust in 
Alaska (except for the Metlakatla Indian Community of the Annette Island Reserve or its 
members) until the D.C. Circuit issues a ruling and mandate resolving Alaska’s appeal.   
10. Navajo Housing Auth. v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban 
Dev., No. 08–CV–00826, 2014 WL 2936924 (D. Colo. 2014).  On April 22, 2008, 
Plaintiff Navajo Housing Authority (Navajo or Tribe) filed an action for judicial review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., claiming that the 
Defendants (collectively “HUD”) violated the Native American Housing Assistance and 
Self–Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq., by reducing the 
number of housing units counted as Formula Current Assisted Stock (FCAS) for the 
calculation of the Tribe’s share of the annual Indian Housing Block Grant (IHBG) and 
recapturing IHBG funds which the Tribe had received in past years.  Defendants shall 
restore to Plaintiff Navajo Housing Authority the amount of $6,165,842 for Indian 
Housing Block Grant (“IHBG”) funds that were illegally recaptured from Plaintiff Navajo. 
Any such restoration shall be in addition to the full IHBG allocation that would otherwise 
be due to the Plaintiff under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act (NAHASDA) in a given fiscal year as calculated without application of 
the amount of the Judgment.   
11. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. United States, No. 13-40644, 2014 
WL 3360472 (5th Cir. 2014).  Tribe brought suit against the United States and various 
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federal agencies, alleging that issuance of drilling leases and permits on land violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act and federal common law.  The government moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The District Court, 2013 WL 1279033, 
adopted the report and recommendation of Roy S. Payne, United States Magistrate 
Judge, 2013 WL 1279051, and granted the motion to dismiss.  Tribe appealed.  The 
Court of Appeals held that federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tribe’s 
claims.  Affirmed. 
B. Child Welfare Law And ICWA 
12. Thompson, et al. v. Fairfax Cnty. Dept. of Family Services, et. al, Nos. 
2185-12-4, 2232-12-4, 2217-12-4, 2216-12-4, 2013 WL 4799747 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).  
County Department of Family Services filed a petition to terminate parental rights of 
both parents of an Indian child.  The Circuit Court held that the guardian ad litem and 
foster parents had not established good cause to retain jurisdiction and ordered the 
case transferred to tribal court, but granted a stay pending appeal.  The guardian ad 
litem and foster parents appealed, and parents appealed an order granting stay.  The 
appellate court held that:  (1) the appropriate standard of review was an abuse of 
discretion; (2) existing Indian family exceptions would not be adopted; (3) the tribal court 
had jurisdiction over both parents; (4) the best interests of the child were relevant in 
considering the transfer; (5) the proceedings were not at an advanced stage; and (6) the 
transfer would not cause undue hardship to parties.  Reversed and remanded. 
13. In the Matter of E.G.M., No. 13–584, 2013 WL 5913807 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2013).  County department of social services (DSS) filed a petition alleging the child 
was a neglected juvenile and was subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).  The 
district court granted legal custody of the child to DSS, ordered child’s continued 
placement with family friend, established a plan of reunification with mother, and 
relieved DSS of further efforts towards reunification with father.  Mother and father 
appealed.               
The appellate court held that:  (1) remand was required to provide for a 
redetermination of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over neglect proceeding 
involving an Indian child; (2) the Court of Appeals could not take judicial notice of 
memorandum of agreement (MOA) Indian tribe and DSS signed; (3) qualified expert 
testimony which would continue custody of the Indian child, by the parent or Indian 
custodian, was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, was 
to be introduced at the hearing which resulted in foster care placement of the Indian 
child; and (4) as a matter of first impression, a trial court may order the cessation of 
reunification efforts in Indian Child Welfare Act cases if the court finds that such efforts 
would clearly be futile.  Vacated and remanded. 
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14. In re Autumn K. v. Patricia M., No. A136586, 2013 WL 6092859, __ Cal. 
Rptr. 3d __ (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).  County Health and Social Services Department 
commenced child dependency proceeding, alleging jurisdiction based on parents’ 
substance abuse problems, and the Indian tribe intervened.  Following the termination 
of reunification services, the Superior Court denied the maternal grandmother’s request 
to be designated as a de facto parent, denied the mother’s request for reinstatement of 
reunification services, terminated parental rights, and ordered adoption as permanent 
plan.  Both parents appealed.  The appellate court held that:  (1) grandfather’s 
misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor was not a non-
exemptable offense; (2) the Department was required by statute to evaluate the 
maternal grandfather’s request for exemption to allow placement of Indian child in the 
grandparents’ home; (3) the tribal custody forms, which the mother and grandmother 
executed upon child’s birth, did not grant the grandmother custody over the Indian child; 
and (4) the court did not improperly apply the existing Indian family doctrine.  Reversed 
and remanded. 
15. Dep’t of Health and Human Services v. J.G., Nos. 0400574JV4; 
0900378M; A153864, 2014 WL 25206 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).  Department of Human 
Services moved to appoint Indian child’s current foster parent as the child’s legal 
guardian.  The Circuit Court granted motion.  Mother appealed.  The appellate court 
held that:  (1) as a matter of first impression, a section of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) allowing any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate foster care actions that 
contravened ICWA was in conflict with the state appellate rule requiring the preservation 
of claim of error to raise error on appeal, and therefore the ICWA section preempted 
state rule; (2) durable guardianship established by trial court was a foster care 
placement as could require the court to make a finding under the ICWA as to whether 
active efforts had been made to prevent breakup of Indian family; but (3) in instant 
action, court was not required to make an active effort finding in guardianship judgment.  
Affirmed. 
16. In re Jayden D. and Dayten J., No. A-13-193, 2014 WL 116032 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2014).  (From the Opinion)  “Yolanda W., formerly known as Yolanda O., appeals 
from the decision of the separate juvenile court of Lancaster County, which denied her 
motion to transfer the termination of parental rights proceeding in this juvenile case to 
tribal court. Because we find that the State failed to establish good cause to deny the 
transfer, we conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the motion 
to transfer.”   
17. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik Civ. 13-5020-JV, 2014 WL 317693, 
2014 WL 317657 (D.S.D. 2014).  Native American tribes and several tribe members 
brought § 1983 action against state officials, alleging policies, practices, and procedures 
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relating to the removal of Native American children from their homes during 48–hour 
hearings, violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA).  Defendants moved to dismiss.  The District Court held that:  
(1) Younger abstention did not apply; (2) Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine did not 
deprive district court of subject matter jurisdiction; (3) tribes had parens patriae 
standing; (4) allegations were sufficient to plead judge and officials were policymakers; 
(5) ICWA provision provided substantive rights; (6) allegations were sufficient to state a 
claim for ICWA violations; and (7) allegations were sufficient to plead denial of their 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.  Motions denied. 
18. In the Matter of Abbigail A., No. C074264, 2014 WL 2705177 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2014).  The county department of health and human services filed dependency 
petitions as to two children.  The Superior Court directed counsel to make reasonable 
efforts to enroll the children and their father in a tribe which had notified the court that 
they were eligible for membership, concluded it was required to treat the eligible minors 
as Indian children under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), but made jurisdictional 
findings and placed the children in the custody of their maternal grandmother.  The 
appellate court held that court rules extending ICWA protections to children merely 
eligible for tribal membership are invalid.  Reversed with directions. 
19. In re I.P. v. M.P., No. E060213, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1516 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014).  Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a dependency petition alleging that the 
child, age four, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  Indian tribe responded 
indicating that the child was eligible for membership and that the tribe was intervening.  
The Superior Court found that the child was adoptable and terminated parental rights, 
and also found, inter alia, that CFS had complied “with the noticing requirements” of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).  Mother appealed.  The appellate court held that the 
mother failed to show a reasonable probability that compliance with the procedural 
requirements of tribal customary adoption would have resulted in an outcome more 
favorable to her.  Affirmed. 
20. In re Interest of Mischa S., No. A–13–265, 22 Neb. App. 105, __ N.W. 
2d __ (Neb. Ct. App. 2014).  State filed a petition to have a child adjudicated as lacking 
proper parental care.  Parents, one of whom was member of Indian tribe, entered a no 
contest admission to petition, and the child was allowed to remain at home, under 
supervision.  Guardian ad litem (GAL) subsequently moved to remove child from home.  
Following a hearing, the County Court ordered the child to be placed in foster care and 
declared a provision of the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unconstitutional.  
Parents appealed.           
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The appellate court held that:  (1) there was not clear and convincing expert 
evidence that serious emotional damage would result if child, who became subject of 
original adjudication petition because of excessive school absences, were not removed 
from parents’ home, as required for foster care placement under Nebraska Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA); (2) juvenile court’s sua sponte determination, that provision of 
Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unconstitutional as applied, was void; 
and (3) in proceedings under the Nebraska ICWA for foster placement of, or termination 
of parental rights to, an Indian child, proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the 
standard for satisfying the court of active efforts to prevent the breakup of Indian family.  
Reversed and remanded. 
21. In re Alexandria P., No. B252999, 2014 WL 4053054, __ Cal. Rptr. 3d __ 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014).  (From the opinion.)  This case involved the placement 
preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).  
At issue is whether the dependency court properly applied the ICWA in finding that the 
foster parents of an Indian child failed to prove good cause to deviate from the ICWA’s 
adoptive placement preferences.  A 17-month–old Indian child was removed from the 
custody of her mother, who has a lengthy substance abuse problem and has lost 
custody of at least six other children, and her father, who has an extensive criminal 
history and has lost custody of one other child.  The girl’s father is an enrolled member 
of an Indian tribe, and the girl is considered an Indian child under the ICWA.  The tribe 
consented to the girl’s placement with a non-Indian foster family to facilitate efforts to 
reunify the girl with her father.  The girl lived in two foster homes before she was placed 
with de facto parents at the age of two.  She bonded with the family and has thrived for 
the past two and a half years.  After reunification efforts failed, the father, the tribe, and 
the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) recommended that the 
girl be placed in Utah with a non-Indian couple who were extended family of the father.  
De facto parents argued good cause existed to depart from the ICWA’s adoptive 
placement preferences and it was in the girl’s best interests to remain with de facto 
family.  The child’s court-appointed counsel argued that good cause did not exist.    
The court ordered the girl placed with the extended family in Utah after finding 
that the de facto parents had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was a 
certainty the child would suffer emotional harm by the transfer.  De facto parents also 
contend that the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences do not apply when the tribe 
has consented to a child’s placement outside of the ICWA’s foster care placement 
preferences.  The court disagreed with their interpretation of the statutory language.  De 
facto parents further contend that the court erroneously applied the clear and convincing 
standard of proof, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, a contention we reject 
based upon the overwhelming authority on the issue.        
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Finally, the de facto parents contend that the court erroneously interpreted the 
"good cause" exception to the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences as requiring 
proof of a certainty that the child would suffer emotional harm if placed with the Utah 
couple, and failed to consider the bond between Alexandria and her foster family, the 
risk of detriment if that bond was broken, and Alexandria’s best interests.  The court 
agreed with this last contention and reversed the placement order because the court’s 
error was prejudicial.  The order transferring custody of the minor to the R.s was 
reversed.  The cause was remanded to determine if good cause existed to deviate from 
the ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences.   
22. In re Candace A., No. S–15251, 2014 WL 4160043, __ P.3d __ (Alaska 
2014).  The superior court adjudicated Candace, a child in need of aid, because she 
had been sexually abused by her adoptive brother.  The Superior Court nonetheless 
ordered that Candace be returned to her parents' home, holding that the Department of 
Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS), had failed to present 
“qualified expert testimony” as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to 
support a finding that she would likely suffer serious physical or emotional harm in her 
parents' custody.  The Superior Court held an adjudication hearing to determine 
whether Candace was a child in need of aid and whether removal from her family home 
could be justified.  OCS called Barbara Cosolito to provide the expert testimony. ICWA 
was required to show “that the continued custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely 
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”  The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) had defined the ICWA phrase “qualified expert witnesses” to include lay 
persons with “substantial experience and knowledge regarding relevant Indian social 
and cultural standards” and “professional persons” who have “substantial education in 
the area of [their] specialty.”  It was against these BIA standards that the Superior Court 
judged the qualifications of OCS's proposed experts.  Social work in Alaska has all the 
earmarks of a profession.  The law requires a state license for the practice of social 
work.  A licensed clinical social worker must have a master's or doctoral degree in social 
work, must have completed at least two years of continuous full-time employment in 
post-graduate clinical social work, must have good moral character and be “in good 
professional standing,” must provide “three professional references” acceptable to the 
licensing board, and must pass the licensing examination.  Social workers are subject to 
a code of ethics, including confidentiality requirements, and must maintain their licenses 
by continuing education courses, including “professional ethics.”  Social workers who do 
not conform to “minimum professional standards” are subject to discipline.  Alaska 
statutes and rules reflect a common understanding that social workers are 
professionals.  And in our case law, we have strongly implied that social workers may 
be qualified experts under the third BIA guideline as long as they have “expertise 
beyond the normal social worker qualifications.”        
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The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's rulings on whether OCS's two 
proffered witnesses were qualified experts for purposes of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e); vacated 
the portion of the adjudication order placing Candace with her parents; and remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.	  
C. Contracting 
23. Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank, No. S–14987, 2014 WL 
1408554, __ P.3d __ (Alaska 2014).  Tribal members who claimed to constitute newly 
elected tribal councilmen brought a declaratory judgment action against a bank to 
determine who was authorized to act on behalf of the tribe and to access the tribe's 
accounts.  A second group of tribal members who claimed to represent the tribe based 
on a competing election was granted intervention to challenge the Superior Court's 
jurisdiction.  The Superior Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the members who 
brought the initial action appealed.  The Supreme Court held that:  (1) the Superior 
Court did not commit reversible error by failing to convert bank's motion to dismiss to a 
motion for summary judgment; (2) any inquiry into the legitimacy of competing tribal 
elections was solely within tribe's retained inherent sovereignty; and (3) the Superior 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over tribal member's declaratory judgment 
action against bank.  Affirmed. 
D. Employment 
24. South v. Lujan, No. 32,015, 2014 WL 3908038, __ P.3d __ (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2014).  Plaintiff-Appellant Tiffany South. a former officer with the Sandia Pueblo 
Police Department, (Plaintiff) filed a complaint for violation of the New Mexico Human 
Rights Act (NMHRA), retaliatory discharge, and tortious inference with contract against 
Defendants-Appellees Isaac Lujan, William Duran, and Mary–Alice Brogdon 
(collectively, Defendants) in their individual capacities.  The district court granted 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction.  Plaintiff, who had been an 
officer with the Sandia Pueblo Police Department (the Department), alleged that 
Defendants Lujan and Duran, the Chief and Captain of the Department, respectively, 
had sexually harassed her and that, together with Defendant Brogdon, the employee 
relations manager for Sandia Pueblo, had retaliated against her after she complained of 
the sexual harassment.  She also maintained that the Defendants interfered with her 
employment contract with Sandia Pueblo “with the explicit motive of terminating [her 
employment] for false reasons[.]”           
Plaintiff is not Indian.  Defendant Lujan is Indian and a member of the Pueblo.  
Defendants Duran and Brogdon are neither Indian nor members of the Pueblo.  Sandia 
Pueblo is not named as a party in the complaint.  Defendants moved for dismissal of the 
complaint, arguing that the NMHRA did not apply to the Pueblo and its employees and 
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that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Pueblo’s sovereign immunity and, therefore, 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint.  They also argued that the 
suit must be dismissed because the Pueblo is a necessary party to the suit, which 
cannot be joined.  After a hearing, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Plaintiff appealed.       
The overarching question presented- does the state court have subject matter 
jurisdiction over these claims?-depended on the answers to a number of components: 
including whether the conduct complained of occurred on the reservation, whether the 
conduct complained of occurred within the scope of employment, whether the Pueblo is 
a necessary party, and to what extent the Pueblo has sought to regulate disputes 
between its employees when employees are sued in tort in their individual capacities.    
Here, there are two important issues that are inadequately developed for review.  
The first is whether the Defendants’ alleged conduct occurred within the scope of 
employment by the Pueblo.  The second issue is whether state court jurisdiction would 
infringe on the Pueblo’s sovereignty under the facts of this case. Being no factual basis 
for the District Court’s ruling in the record, the Court reversed and remanded the case to 
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.  
E. Environmental Regulations 
25. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Village of Hobart, Wis., No. 12 3419, 
2013 WL 5692337 (7th Cir. 2013).  An Indian tribe filed action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the village lacked authority to impose charges under its storm water 
management utility ordinance on parcels of land held in trust by the United States for 
the tribe located on reservation and within village.  The tribe also sought injunctive relief 
enjoining the village from attempting to enforce its ordinance upon tribal lands.  The 
tribe filed motion for summary judgment.  The United States filed a motion for summary 
judgment on village's third-party complaint against the United States, alleging that the 
United States, as holder of the bare title to the tribal trust lands, had to pay the storm 
water fees if the tribe was not responsible for doing so.  The District Court, 891 F. Supp. 
2d 1058, granted motions.  Village appealed.  The appellate court held that:  (1) the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) did not authorize village to impose storm water management 
charges upon property held in trust for the benefit of Indian tribe; (2) the village's storm 
water management charges constituted an impermissible tax upon tribal trust property; 
and (3) the United States was not obligated to pay storm water management taxes 
imposed by village upon tribal lands.  Affirmed. 
26. Okla. Dept. of Envtl. Quality v. E.P.A., No. 11–1307, 740 F.3d 185 
(D.D.C. 2014).  Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality petitioned for review of 
final rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean 
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Air Act (CAA), which established a federal implementation plan for the attainment of 
national air quality standards in Indian country.  The Appellate Court held that:  
(1) Oklahoma had standing to bring petition; (2) Oklahoma’s petition was not time-
barred; (3) Oklahoma did not forfeit its claim that state implementation plan 
presumptively applied in non-reservation Indian country; and (4) EPA had no authority 
under the CAA to issue the rule.  Petition granted. 
27. HonoluluTraffic.com v. Federal Transit Admin., No. 13–15277, 2014 
WL 607320, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2014).  Consortium of interest groups and individuals 
opposing high-speed rail project filed action against Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA), Department of Transportation (DOT), municipality, and various federal and local 
administrators asserting challenges under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and Department of Transportation Act.  The 
District Court, 2012 WL 5386595, entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor 
on most claims, but enjoined construction of the project’s fourth phase pending remand 
to agency.  Plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) district court’s order 
was final reviewable decision; (2) statement of purpose in project’s final environmental 
impact statement (FEIS) did not unreasonably restrict project’s purpose and need; 
(3) FEIS adequately considered alternatives; (4) FTA’s finding that managed lanes 
alternative (MLA) and bus rapid transit alternatives were not prudent was not arbitrary or 
capricious; and (5) FTA and city were not required to complete their identification and 
evaluation of Native Hawaiian burial sites before approving project.  Affirmed. 
28. Public Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreu, Nos. 
10-1067, 10-1073, 10-1079, and 10-1238, 2014 WL 985394, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 
2014).  In consolidated cases, individuals and environmental groups brought 
interrelated claims concerning several administrative decisions made by federal 
agencies approving construction of various aspects of offshore wind energy project in 
Nantucket Sound.  Wind energy contractor intervened, and parties moved and cross-
moved for summary judgment.  The District Court held that:  (1) Coast Guard’s terms 
and conditions for project were reasonable under Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2006; (2) United States Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) did not violate Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; (3) Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) required United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to independently make 
determination to discard operational adjustment; (4) biological opinion of National 
Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) was not arbitrary and capricious; (5) NMFS 
violated ESA by failing to include incidental take statement concerning North Atlantic 
right whales in its biological opinion; (6) NMFS appropriately considered project’s 
potential impact on listed sea turtles; (7) Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not require BOEM 
to obtain FWS permit to take migratory birds prior to approving project; (8) BOEM 
appropriately conducted consultation process under National Historic Preservation Act; 
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(9) BOEM’s final environmental impact state (EIS) was not arbitrary and capricious; and 
(10) BOEM was not required to prepare new or supplemental EIS.  Motions granted in 
part and denied in part. 
29. Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada v. U.S. Dept. 
of the Interior, No. 12-15412, 2014 WL 1244275 (9th Cir. 2014).  Indian tribes brought 
action challenging Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) approval of mining project on 
federal land, alleging violations of Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  Project owner intervened.  The District 
Court, 2012 WL 13780, granted summary judgment in favor of BLM and project owner.  
Tribes appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) BLM did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously when it determined further accommodation of Indian tribes’ religious use of 
pediment area of piñon-juniper groves at base of mountain in project area was not 
practicable, and (2) BLM did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in analyzing project’s 
impacts on water resources.  Affirmed. 
30. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, Nos. 12–5156, 12–5157, 
2014 WL 1328164 (D.D.C. 2014).  The natural gas company brought action against the 
United States and other federal entities, alleging failure to fulfill obligations under 
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in connection with 
certain properties alleged to be contaminated with residual radioactive waste. The 
Indian tribe intervened, asserting claims under UMTRCA and federal and tribal law.  
Defendants moved to dismiss.  The District Court, 774 F. Supp. 2d 40 and 847 F. Supp. 
2d 111, granted motions.  Defendants appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  
(1) Comprehensive Environmental Resources, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) barred court’s jurisdiction over RCRA claims related to landfill site; 
(2) dismissal of RCRA claims under CERCLA should have been without prejudice; 
(3) tribe’s RCRA claims in relation to other site were not moot; (4) as matter of first 
impression, governmental agencies are persons entitled to bring citizen suits under 
RCRA; (5) UMTRCA did not preclude judicial review of tribe’s APA claims; (6) tribe 
failed to state “failure to act” claims under APA; and (7) tribe did not have cause of 
action against United States for breach of trust duties.  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
31. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Serv., No. 1:14–CV–3052, 2014 WL 1778391, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (E.D. Wash. 
2014).  Before the court was plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order.  This 
case concerns guided bus tours for members of the general public on Rattlesnake 
Mountain in the Hanford Reach National Monument conducted by Defendant United 
States Fish and Wildlife Services (“USFWS”).  Plaintiff Confederated Tribes and Bands 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015 
	  
	   469 
of the Yakama Nation (“the Yakama Nation”) sought judicial review of the USFWS’s 
agency decision and actions that the guided tours will have no adverse effect on the 
site, which has been designated a Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) under the 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).  Rattlesnake Mountain, overlooking the 
Hanford Site in Benton County, Washington, is known to the Yakama Nation as Laliik, 
and means “standing above the water.”        
Laliik has cosmological, religious, and cultural significance for the Yakama Nation 
and other Indian tribes.  The Yakama Nation ceded the land on which Laliik is situated 
to the United States under the Treaty of 1855.  In 2007, Laliik was designated as a 
Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) pursuant to § 101(d)(6)(A) of the NHPA.  A TCP is a 
“property of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe” and is 
thereby eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.  USFWS issued a 
finding that the wildflower tours presented “no adverse effect” on the Laliik TCP.  State 
Historic Preservation Officer Allyson Brooks notified the USFWS that she did not concur 
with the finding of no adverse effect.  USFWS informed the Tribe that it would have the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation review the new proposal because the Tribe 
and the State Historical Preservation Office had not concurred with the USFWS.  The 
Tribe told the ACHP that it did not concur with the new tours proposal.  The ACHP 
recommended to USFWS that it consult further with the Tribe prior to any further 
wildflower tours on the Laliik TCP, citing the allegedly unfollowed work controls and the 
Tribe’s belief that there was an adverse effect.  The Yakama Nation was told that the 
USFWS had made a final agency decision to proceed with eight wildflower tours and 
then filed its complaint.  After the first two days of tours occurred, the Tribe moved the 
Court for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the tours scheduled for May 8 and 
10, 2014.  
The Court found that the record before the Court does not support the issuance 
of such a “drastic remedy” as a TRO provides and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order.   
32. WaterLegacy Advocacy v. U.S. E.P.A., No. 13–1323, 2014 WL 2462852 
(D. Minn. 2014).  Non-profit environmental organizations and Indian tribes brought 
action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief pursuant to the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of a water quality standards variance for a 
commercial-scale iron nugget production facility.  EPA filed unopposed motion to vacate 
its approval of variance and remand the matter to the agency for further consideration, 
and facility owner moved to intervene.  The District Court held that:  (1) facility owner 
was not required to specify whether it sought intervention as a plaintiff or defendant in 
motion to intervene; (2) intervention motion was not moot; (3) timeliness factors 
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weighed in favor of intervention of facility owner; and (4) district court would not vacate 
EPA’s approval of variance on remand to agency for further consideration.  Motions 
granted. 
33. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et al. v. Dep’t Of Environmental Quality, No. 
307602, 2014 WL 3928563, __ N.W. 2d __ (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).  Appellants appealed 
by leave granted from the circuit court’s order affirming the decision of the Department 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to grant a mining permit to the Kennecott Eagle 
Minerals Company.  At issue is appellee Kennecott Eagle’s proposal to develop an 
underground mine to extract nickel and copper from the sulfide ores beneath the 
headwaters of the Salmon Trout River.  The Keweenaw Bay Indian Community 
intervened in this case over its concerns over the impacts of mining operations on the 
cultural traditions associated with Eagle Rock.  Appellees objected to further 
development of this issue below on the ground that appellants had stipulated to limit 
such advocacy to the issue of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community’s standing to 
intervene.  The ALJ, however, reached the issue on its merits, and determined that 
further findings were in order.  The DEQ’s final decision-maker, however, alternatively 
concluded that a stipulation kept the issue off the table, and that “place of worship” for 
purposes of Rule 425.202(2)(p) referred to buildings for human occupancy, not purely 
outdoor locations. The circuit court in turn affirmed the DEQ on those alternative 
grounds.    
            
The court affirmed on still other grounds.  Kennecott submitted its EIA in 
February 2006, and public hearings on the mining application were held in September 
of that year.  In their brief on appeal, appellants advise that Kennecott and the DEQ 
“were informed of the significance of Eagle Rock during the Part 632 public comment 
period,” thus admitting that Kennecott had no knowledge of any such customs when it 
submitted its EIA.  Appellants nowhere suggest that any investigation or inquiry on 
Kennecott’s part in those early stages of the proceedings was deficient, nor do they cite 
any authority for the proposition that a mining applicant is obliged to update its EIA 
throughout the whole review process to take account of newly acquired information.  
Accordingly, assuming without deciding that no stipulation prevented litigation of this 
issue, and also that “places of worship” for purposes of Rule 425.202(2)(p) include such 
outdoor locations as Eagle Rock, we nonetheless hold that Kennecott Eagle’s EIA was 
not deficient for want of consideration of Eagle Rock as a place of worship, because it 
neither knew, nor should have known, of such traditional cultural uses of that location 
when it offered its EIA.  For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the circuit court 
affirming the DEQ’s decision to grant Kennecott Eagle a Part 632 mining permit.  
Affirmed.  
 
F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR 
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34. Squaxin Island Tribe v. Wash. State Dept. of Ecology, No. 42710–9–II, 
312 P.3d 766 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2013).  Indian tribe sought review of Department 
of Ecology’s denial of its rulemaking petition, which sought amendments to watershed 
management rules to protect minimum instream flows of creek.  The Superior Court 
found that denial of petition was arbitrary and capricious.  Department appealed.  The 
appellate court held that:  (1) Department’s written denial of tribe’s rulemaking petition 
satisfied statute that required agency to provide reasons for rejecting a rulemaking 
request, and (2) decision to deny tribe’s rulemaking petition was not arbitrary and 
capricious.  Reversed. 
35. U.S. v. Brown; U.S. v. Jerry A. Reyes, a/k/a Otto Reyes, Marc L. 
Lyons, and Frederick W. Tibbetts, a/k/a Bud Tibbetts, Nos. 13–68 and 13–70, 2013 
WL 6175202 (D. Minn. 2013).  Defendants Michael Brown, Jerry Reyes, Marc Lyons, 
and Frederick Tibbetts were indicted for violating the Lacey Act by transporting and 
selling fish in violation of tribal law.  16 U.S.C. § 3372(a).1  Defendants moved to 
dismiss their respective indictments on the grounds that, as members of the Leech Lake 
and White Earth bands of Chippewa Indians, their right to fish on the Leech Lake 
Reservation is protected by the 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa, 7 Stat. 536, July 29, 
1837, such that the federal prosecution violated their treaty rights.  U.S. Magistrate 
Judge Brisbois issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) in each case, 
recommending that the Court deny Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  Defendants 
objected to the R&Rs.  The Court sustained the objections.  The Court dismissed 
Defendants’ indictments because the 1837 Treaty protects Defendants’ right to fish on 
the reservation and Congress has not specifically abrogated that right. 
36. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas v. 
Black, No. 06-2248, 2013 WL 6796423 (D. Kan. 2013).  Before the court were cross 
motions for summary judgment filed by defendant Nemaha Brown Watershed Joint 
District No. 7 and plaintiff Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of the Kickapoo Reservation in 
Kansas.  The Tribe and the District entered into the Watershed Plan and Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Upper Delaware and Tributaries Watershed (Agreement) in 
1994 to serve as co-sponsors of a project aimed to carry out works of improvement for 
soil conservation and for other purposes, including flood prevention.  The parties agreed 
to co-sponsor the project after failed attempts by each party to sponsor the project on its 
own.  In addition to twenty floodwater retarding dams and other various improvements, 
the Agreement included plans for a multipurpose dam with recreational facilities, 
otherwise known as the “Plum Creek Project.”  The Tribe asked the District multiple 
times to exercise its power of eminent domain to condemn non-Indian-owned land for 
the Plum Creek Project that the Tribe had been unable to acquire on its own.  The 
District declined the Tribe’s request each time.  In essence, the Tribe claimed that the 
Agreement is a binding contract that obligates the District to condemn 1,200 acres of 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015 
	  
	   472 
land on the Tribe’s behalf to build the Plum Creek Project.  The court granted summary 
judgment in the District’s favor and against the Tribe based on its determination as a 
matter of law that the Agreement does not obligate the District to condemn on the 
Tribe’s behalf.   
37. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Goldmark, No. C13–5071, 2014 WL 119022, 
__ F. Supp. 2d __ (W.D. Wash. 2014).  An Indian tribe brought action against 
government officials, seeking to protect the privilege of hunting and gathering roots and 
berries on open and unclaimed lands, guaranteed by Treaty.  Defendants moved to 
dismiss.  The District Court held that:  (1) Indian tribe established a cognizable injury for 
purposes of Article III standing; (2) Eleventh Amendment did not bar Indian tribe's 
claims against county prosecutors; (3) Eleventh Amendment did not bar Indian tribe's 
claims against Director of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) and 
Chief of WDFW Enforcement; (4) Eleventh Amendment did not bar Indian tribe's claims 
against Washington State Attorney General; (5) Eleventh Amendment barred Indian 
tribe's claims against the Washington State Commissioner of Public Lands and 
Administrator for the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the Supervisor for 
DNR; (6) other signatory Indian tribes to Treaty were necessary parties; and 
(7) prejudice to other signatory Indian tribes to Treaty, who were necessary parties and 
who could not be joined due to their sovereign immunity, warranted dismissal.  Motion 
granted. 
38. U.S. v. Lummi Nation, No. 12–35936, 2014 WL 4067168, __ F.3d __ (9th 
Cir. 2014).  In proceedings to adjudicate fishing rights reserved by 1855 Treaty of Point 
Elliott, Lower Elwha Band of S’Klallams, Jamestown Band of S’Klallams, Port Gamble 
Band of S’Klallams, and Skokomish Indian Tribe sought determination that the Lummi 
Indian Tribe was violating 1974 District Court opinion in United States v. Washington by 
fishing in areas outside its adjudicated usual and accustomed grounds and stations.  
The District Court dismissed the action following the entry of summary judgment order 
in 1990 in favor of plaintiff tribes, determining that the 1974 opinion did not intend to 
include disputed areas within Lummi tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations.  Plaintiff tribes appealed.  The Appellate Court, 235 F.3d 443, affirmed in part 
and reversed in part.  On remand, the District Court, 2012 WL 4846239, entered 
summary judgment on Klallam tribes’ request for determination that Lummi tribe’s usual 
and accustomed grounds did not include eastern portion of Strait of Juan de Fuca or 
waters west of Whidbey Island. Lummi tribe appealed.  The Appellate Court held that 
law of the case doctrine did not control determination of Lummi tribe’s usual and 
accustomed grounds.  Reversed and remanded. 
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G. Gaming 
39. State ex rel. Dewberry v. Kitzhaber, No. A146366, 2013 WL 6022097, 
__ P.3d __ (Or. Ct. App. 2013).  Residents near site of proposed casino brought action 
as relators for a writ of mandamus, challenging the Governor’s authority to enter into a 
gaming compact with tribes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).  The 
Circuit Court dismissed the petition, and residents appealed.  The Appellate Court, 187 
P.3d 220, reversed and remanded, and the State appealed.  The Supreme Court, 346 
Or. 260, 210 P.3d 884, affirmed and remanded.  On remand, the Circuit Court entered 
summary judgment in favor of Governor and tribes.  Property owners appealed.  The 
Appellate Court held that:  (1) State statute governing agreements by the state and local 
governments with American Indian tribes conferred authority on Governor to enter into 
gaming compact with Indian tribes under IGRA; (2) the state constitutional ban on the 
operation of casinos in the state does not apply on Indian lands located within state’s 
borders; and (3) the statute authorizing the Governor to enter into gaming compact with 
Indian tribes did not improperly delegate legislative functions to the Governor in violation 
of separation of powers doctrine.  Affirmed. 
40. Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, Nos. 10–17803, 10–17878, 2014 WL 
211763 (9th Cir. 2014).  An Indian tribe brought action alleging that the State violated 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) by failing to negotiate in good faith for a 
casino on a particular 11-acre parcel of land.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for the tribe, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149, but, subsequently, granted the State’s 
motion for a stay pending appeal, 2012 WL 298464.  Both parties appealed.  The 
Appellate Court held that:  (1) the tribe’s right to request negotiations under the IGRA 
depends on it having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposed to conduct 
gaming; (2) the State could waive the IGRA’s “Indian lands” requirement; (3) the State’s 
challenge to entrustment of 11-acre parcel of land to tribe was timely; and (4) the 
11-acre parcel of land did not constitute “Indian lands” over which tribe could demand 
negotiations.  Reversed and remanded. 
41. Friends of Amador County v. Salazar, No. 11–17996, 2014 WL 308560 
(9th Cir. 2014).  An advocacy organization and its members brought action against the 
State of California and its Governor, the Department of the Interior (DOI) and its 
Secretary, and the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) and its Acting 
Chairman, challenging the state’s gaming compact with an Indian Tribe, and the federal 
recognition of the Tribe.  The Indian tribe intervened.  The District Court, 2011 WL 
4709883, granted the Tribe’s motion to dismiss, and denied a motion to vacate the 
dismissal, 2011 WL 6141291.  The advocacy organization and its members appealed.  
The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the Indian Tribe was a required party; (2) the District Court did not 
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abuse its discretion in determining that it would not be feasible to join the Indian Tribe; 
(3) the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Indian Tribe was 
an indispensable party; and (4) the public rights exception to joinder did not apply.  
Affirmed. 
42. Catawba Indian Nation v. State, No. 2012–212118, 2014 WL 1307180, 
__ S.E. 2d __ (S.C. 2014).  An Indian tribe brought a declaratory judgment action 
against the state to determine the effect of Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights.  
The Circuit Court granted state summary judgment.  Tribe appealed.  The Supreme 
Court held that:  (1) declaratory judgment action was not precluded by doctrine of 
collateral estoppel; (2) action was not precluded by doctrine of res judicata; but (3) Act 
did not authorize tribe to offer video poker on its reservation.  Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
43. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority, No. 2:13–CV–178, 2014 WL 
1400232 (M.D. Ala. 2014).  (From the opinion.)  The State of Alabama brought an equity 
action under state-nuisance law and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701-2721, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168, to prevent allegedly unlawful gaming at three 
Indian-run casinos in Alabama:  Creek Casino in Elmore County; Wind Creek Casino in 
Escambia County; and Creek Casino in Montgomery County.  Defendants are PCI 
Gaming Authority, the commercial entity through which the Poarch Band of Creek 
Indians ("Poarch Band") operates the casinos, and members of PCI Gaming Authority 
and of the Poarch Band Tribal Council in their official capacities.  After careful 
consideration of the arguments of counsel, the pertinent law, and the pleadings, as 
supplemented by the undisputed evidence, the court found that the Defendants' motion 
to dismiss was due to be granted.	  
H. Jurisdiction, Federal 
44. U.S. v. Zepeda, No. 10-10131, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 5273093, (9th Cir. 
2013).  On October 25, 2008, Damien Zepeda was charged with conspiracy to commit 
assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence.  
The indictment alleged that Zepeda was an “Indian [ ].”  Following a jury trial, Zepeda 
was convicted of all counts.  Zepeda’s appeal called upon the court to decide whether a 
Certificate of Enrollment in an Indian tribe, entered into evidence through the parties’ 
stipulation, was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was an Indian for the purposes of § 1153 where the government 
offers no evidence that the defendant’s bloodline is derived from a federally recognized 
tribe.  At Zepeda’s trial, the government introduced into evidence a document entitled 
“Gila River Enrollment/Census Office Certified Degree of Indian Blood.”  The document 
bore an “official seal” and stated that Zepeda was “an enrolled member of the Gila River 
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Indian Community,” and that “information [wa]s taken from the official records and 
membership roll of the Gila River Indian Community.”  It also stated that Zepeda had a 
“Blood Degree” of “1/4 Pima [and] 1/4 Tohono O’Odham” for a total of 1/2.  The 
prosecutor and Zepeda’s attorney stipulated to admission of the Certificate into 
evidence without objection.  On appeal, Zepeda argued inter alia, that the government 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an Indian under § 1153.    
The Appellate Court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to 
establish that Zepeda was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under § 
1153 because the government introduced no evidence that Zepeda’s bloodline was 
derived from a federally recognized tribe.  The court reversed Zepeda’s convictions 
under § 1153, in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment.  Zepeda’s conviction for 
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 was unaffected by this disposition.  Reversed 
in part and remanded for resentencing.   
45. Trazell v. Wilmers, No. 12–01369, 2013 WL 5593042 (D.D.C. 2013).  Car 
owner, a member of the Cherokee-Choctaw nation, brought action against bank, its 
director, and bank employee, alleging that the defendants repossessed his vehicle in 
violation of Treaty of Watertown, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, several of his statutory 
rights, international resolutions, and District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss and the owner moved for summary judgment.  The District 
Court held that:  (1) owner's complaint failed to state claim for violation of Treaty of 
Watertown; (2) the complaint failed to state claim for violation of Fourth Amendment, 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and section 1983; (3) the complaint failed to 
state claim for violation of statute providing protection to foreign officials, official guests, 
and internationally protected persons from physical attack or imprisonment; (4) the 
complaint failed to state claim for violation of statue governing loans by a bank on its 
own stock; (5) the complaint stated claim for violation of municipal regulation requiring 
holder to retain or store repossessed vehicle for 15 days; and (6) the genuine dispute of 
material fact existed as to whether defendants had valid security interest in owner's 
vehicle.  Defendants' motion was granted in part, denied in part and the owner's motion 
denied. 
46. Brenner v. Bendigo, No. CIV 13–0005, 2013 WL 5652457 (D.S.D. 2013).  
Plaintiff Michelle Brenner (Brenner) filed an Affidavit for Garnishment (Affidavit) seeking 
to enforce a tribal court judgment in Federal District Court pursuant to a state 
garnishment statute.  Garnishees Beau Bendigo, Larry Bendigo, and Bendigo Ranch 
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that this Court lacks subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction to enforce the tribal court judgment, that the Affidavit failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, and that Brenner had not complied with South Dakota 
Codified Law (SDCL) 21–18–9.  Brenner brought a wrongful death action against Cody 
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Bendigo in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court.  In an Order on Damages dated 
December 20, 2006, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court awarded Brenner a 
$3,000,000.00 judgment against Cody Bendigo.  It does not appear that Brenner has 
sought first to enforce this judgment in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court before 
attempting the collection proceeding before this Court.  Beau Bendigo is an enrolled 
member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe who lives with his father, Larry Bendigo, on 
tribal trust land within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.  Beau 
Bendigo's ranch, called Bendigo Ranch, and ranching equipment are on tribal trust land 
that he leases from the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and sit within the confines of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.  
Thus, it appears that all the property that Brenner seeks to execute upon is either tribal 
trust land held in trust by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe or assets located on tribal trust property within the Cheyenne River Indian 
Reservation.  The court granted the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s Affidavit for Garnishment. 
47. Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 
No. 13-00123, 2013 WL 5954391 (D. Utah 2013).  This matter was before the court on 
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6).  Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff Becker’s amended complaint, which 
stated three causes of action:  (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; and (3) accounting.  Becker’s claims arose from a dispute over an 
agreement he entered into with one or more of the defendants.  Because plaintiff’s 
complaint did not, on its face, plead causes of action created by federal law, and 
because the plaintiff’s causes of action did not include, as an essential element, any 
right or immunity created by federal law, the court concluded that plaintiff’s claims did 
not meet the “arising under” standard for federal-question jurisdiction and that the court 
was without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims.  Accordingly, the court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed 
plaintiff’s amended complaint.   
48. F.T.C. v. AMG Services, Inc., No. 2:12–CV–00536, 2014 WL 910302 (D. 
Nev. 2014).  Pending before the court for consideration was the Report and 
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.  The FTC filed its Complaint alleging that 
defendants had violated portions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41–58; the Truth /in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f; and the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C.  §§ 1693-1693r.  These violations were 
alleged to have occurred in connection with the defendants’ activities in offering and 
extending “high-fee, short-term ‘payday’ loans and the collection of those loans.”  The 
FTC’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and the defendants’ Motions for Legal 
Determination were referred to the Magistrate Judge.  The Magistrate Judge 
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recommended an order granting in part and denying in part the FTC’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Tribal Chartered 
Defendants’ Motion for Legal Determination and defendant Little Axe’s Cross–Motion for 
Legal Determination.  Defendant Little Axe filed an Objection in which he argues that 
the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the FTC does have authority under the FTC 
Act to regulate Indian tribes, arms of Indian tribes, employees of arms of Indian tribes, 
and contractors of arms of Indian tribes and in failing to apply Indian law canons and 
certain Supreme Court opinions that defendant LittleAxe asserted are controlling on this 
issue.  The Tribal Chartered defendants filed an Objection in which they argued that the 
Magistrate Judge erred in his conclusion that (1) the defendants bear the burden of 
proving whether the FTC Act applies to the Tribal Chartered Defendants and that (2) the 
FTC has authority under the FTC Act to regulate Indian tribes, arms of Indian tribes, 
employees of arms of Indian tribes, and contractors of arms of Indian tribes.  The court 
found that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the FTC Act is a federal statute of 
general applicability that under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent grants the FTC 
authority to regulate arms of Indian tribes, their employees, and their contractors.  The 
court accepted and adopted in full, to the extent it is not inconsistent with this opinion 
the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendations.   
49. Tavares, et al. v. Whitehouse, et al., No. 2:13–cv–02101, 2014 WL 
1155798 (E.D. Cal. 2014).  This matter was before the Court on Respondents’ Motion to 
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  Petitioners are members of the United Auburn Indian 
Community (“Tribe”).  Petitioners challenged punishment imposed on them by the Tribal 
Council of the United Auburn Indian Community.  Respondents, members of the Tribal 
Council, sought dismissal, arguing the case concerned internal tribal matters, and 
therefore the Court lacked jurisdiction.  Petitioners opposed dismissal arguing their 
petition was within the Court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1303, because their exclusion from tribal lands and suspension of 
per capita gaming benefits. Although temporary, it still constituted “detention” within the 
meaning of the statute.  This case arose from a dispute over tribal management.  
Petitioners initiated an unsuccessful recall campaign attempting to remove 
Respondents, members of the Tribal Council, from office.  Afterward, the Tribal Council 
determined Petitioners had violated a Tribal ordinance prohibiting defamation.  
Petitioners alleged their punishment was imposed in retaliation for the recall campaign.  
Petitioners argued their punishment constituted banishment, invoking this Court’s ICRA 
habeas jurisdiction.  The Court analyzed the issue raised by Respondents’ motion: 
whether Petitioners’ punishment was so severe a restraint on liberty it constituted 
“detention” sufficient to invoke the Court’s federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under 
ICRA.  The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act was 
dismissed.   
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50. Hawkins v. Attatayuk, No. S–14812, 2014 WL 1408563, __ P.3d __ 
(Alaska 2014).  Former wife brought trespass action against former husband.  The 
Superior Court entered judgment in favor of former wife.  Former husband appealed.  
The Supreme Court held that Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate title to Alaska Native townsite property allegedly owned by former wife.  
Reversed and remanded with directions.  
51. E.E.O.C. v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, No. 13–MC–61, 
2014 WL 1795137 (E.D. Wis. 2014).  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
filed this action to enforce a subpoena it served pursuant to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA or the Act) on the Forest County Potawatomi Community 
(Tribe) in its capacity as proprietor of Potawatomi Bingo Casino.  The subpoena sought 
information relating to a charge of discrimination filed by Federico Colón, who was not a 
member of the Tribe but who was employed at the Casino as a “security shift manager.”  
The Tribe contended that it was not subject to the ADEA and that therefore the 
subpoena was invalid.  It also contended that the subpoena should not be enforced 
because the EEOC had failed to conciliate and because the subpoena sought irrelevant 
information.  The Tribe’s primary argument as to why it was not covered by the ADEA 
was that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the Act.  The court concluded 
that the ADEA was generally applicable and therefore presumed to apply to Indian 
tribes; that the Tribe’s relationship with Colón was covered by the ADEA; that the EEOC 
was not bound by a statement made in a dismissal determination; that sovereign 
immunity does not prevent the Tribe from having to comply with the EEOC’s subpoena; 
and that information relating to age-based complaints made by employees other than 
Colón around and after the time of his termination is relevant.  The court ordered that 
the Tribe shall comply with the subpoena within thirty days. 
52. Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, No. S-13-1044, 2014 
WL 1922783 (E.D. Cal. 2014).  Tribe member brought California state court action 
against tribe and tribal health program and board, alleging, inter alia, that tribe member 
was wrongfully terminated due to her illness in violation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA).  Following removal, tribe moved to dismiss.  The district court held 
that tribe waived sovereign immunity by removing action to federal court.  Motion 
granted in part and denied in part. 
53. Caddo Nation of Okla. v. Court of Indian Offenses for the Anadarko 
Agency, No. 14-281,  2014 WL 3880464 (W.D. Okla. 2014).  Before the Court was 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.  This action arose out of a dispute between two 
competing factions, each claiming, to the exclusion of the other, to have leadership of 
and control over the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma.  A faction supporting Vice–Chairman 
Phillip Smith, on behalf of the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma, filed suit on March 13, 2014, 
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in the Court of Indian Offenses for the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma, Anadarko, 
Oklahoma.  That faction obtained emergency injunctive relief to enjoin Plaintiff Brenda 
Edwards from acting as Chairperson for the Caddo Nation.  The Court of Indian 
Offenses for the Caddo Nation, Anadarko, Oklahoma is the Defendant in this action.  
Defendant is one of the courts established by the United States Department of the 
Interior pursuant to 25 C.F.R. Part 11.  On March 20, 2014, Plaintiffs, a faction 
supporting Brenda Edwards, commenced this action on behalf of the Caddo Nation of 
Oklahoma and moved for issuance of a temporary restraining order.  Plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin the enforcement of the Emergency Order issued by the CFR Court against 
Plaintiff Brenda Edwards.        
The Court denied the request for issuance of a temporary restraining order, 
finding Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). It was well-
established that as a matter of comity, a federal court should not exercise jurisdiction 
over cases arising under its federal question or diversity jurisdiction, if those cases are 
also subject to tribal jurisdiction, until the parties have exhausted their tribal remedies.  
Plaintiffs contended the tribal exhaustion requirement should not apply because the 
CFR Court was not a tribal court and further, because the CFR Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider the dispute.  The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ contentions and 
found that Plaintiffs’ contentions are based on the false presumption that the CFR Court 
clearly lacks jurisdiction over the dispute between the two factions.      
The proceedings in the CFR Court were the first to be filed and a factual record 
has been made in those proceedings addressing the jurisdictional issue.  Plaintiffs have 
the opportunity to be heard in that forum, to raise the jurisdictional challenges there, and 
to appeal any adverse determination.  The Court found it should abstain from exercising 
jurisdiction until Plaintiffs have fully exhausted the remedies available to them in the 
tribal courts.  When tribal remedies are fully exhausted, Plaintiffs may then, if 
necessary, proceed in federal court.  The Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
and dismissed the action without prejudice to refiling. 
I. Religious Freedom 
54. Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, et al., No. 12-41015, 2013 
WL 4517263 (5th Cir. 2013).  State prisoner brought action against prison officials, 
challenging restrictions on his Native American religious practices under the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  The District Court, 2012 WL 
3257836, adopted report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge, 2012 WL 3257813, 
and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Prisoner appealed.  The 
Appellate Court held that:  (1) prison’s complete ban on communal pipe-smoking did not 
violate RLUIPA; (2) prison’s schedule of Native American religious services did not 
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violate RLUIPA; (3) prison policy limiting Native American Smudging ritual to outdoor 
ceremonies did not violate RLUIPA, but (4) genuine issue of material fact with regard to 
whether prison’s refusal to allow prisoner to possess locks of relatives’ hair in 
accordance with his Native American religious practice was least restrictive means of 
furthering prison’s compelling interests precluded summary judgment.  Affirmed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded. 
55. Yellowbear v. Lampert, No. 12–8048, 2014 WL 241981 (10th Cir. 2014).  
State prisoner commenced action against individual prison officials, seeking prospective 
injunctive relief against them for violations of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA).  The District Court granted summary judgment for prison 
personnel.  Prisoner appealed.  The Appellate Court held that factual issue existed as to 
whether preventing state prisoner from exercising his sincerely held religious belief that 
using sweat lodge cleansed and purified his mind, spirit, and body served compelling 
governmental interest and that it was least restrictive means of furthering that interest.  
Vacated and remanded. 
56. State v. Armitage, Nos. SCWC–29794, SCWC–29795, SCWC–29796, 
2014 WL 305638, __ P.3d __ (Haw. 2014).  Three defendants, all native Hawaiians, 
were each charged by complaint with entering the Kahojolawe island reserve without 
authorization, a petty misdemeanor.  The cases were consolidated.  The parties entered 
into a stipulation as to evidence, and the District Court found defendants guilty as 
charged.  Defendants appealed.  The Intermediate Court of Appeals, 2013 WL 
1829663, affirmed.  Defendants filed an application for writ of certiorari, which the 
Supreme Court accepted.  The Supreme Court held that:  (1) complaints did not allege 
the requisite state of mind, requiring dismissal without prejudice; (2) statute of limitations 
did not bar the prosecution from refiling complaints against defendants; (3) evidence 
was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) native Hawaiian privilege did not bar the 
convictions; (5) defendants had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
administrative rule prohibiting a person from entering the reserve without authorization; 
(6) expressed purpose of defendants in entering the reserve involved conduct that did 
not constitute speech protected under the First Amendment; and (7) defendants did not 
show that the exercise of their religion was substantially burdened by the prohibition rule 
or a related procedure rule.  Vacated and remanded. 
57. Rayellen Resources, Inc. v. New Mexico Cultural Properties Review 
Committee, No. 33,497, 2014 WL 486088 (N.M. 2014).  Objectors sought review of 
decision of Cultural Properties Review Committee to permanently list approximately 
400,000 acres of public land on mountain as a registered cultural property under 
Cultural Properties Act.  The Fifth Judicial District Court affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  Proponents petitioned for certiorari and objectors cross-petitioned for certiorari.  
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015 
	  
	   481 
The Court of Appeals granted petitions and certified case.  The Supreme Court held 
that:  (1) notice about public comment period satisfied procedural due process; (2) the 
listing satisfied Act requirements on maintenance, inspection, and integrity; (3) land 
grant common lands did not constitute “state land” subject to regulation under Act; 
(4) substantial evidence supported Committee’s findings on historic eligibility; 
(5) Committee had discretion to fine-tune boundaries during course of Committee’s 
investigation of request for a permanent listing; (6) Committee’s apparent clerical error 
in calculating total number of acres did not render the listing arbitrary and capricious; 
and (7) the listing did not violate Establishment Clause.  Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded.  
58. Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, Nos. 13–1401, 13–2745, 
2014 WL 1644130, 750 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2014).  Native American organization and 
inmates brought action against prison officials, claiming that the prison's policy of 
prohibiting tobacco use by Native American inmates during religious activities 
substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in violation of the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  The District Court, 897 F. Supp. 
2d 828, found the restrictions violated RLUIPA and ordered parties to confer.  After the 
parties failed to agree on a new tobacco policy, the District Court, 2013 WL 310633, 
entered a remedial order granting injunctive relief.  The prison officials appealed.  The 
Appellate Court held that:  (1) the inmates' use of tobacco during Native American 
ceremonies was a religious exercise; (2) the prison's complete ban on tobacco use 
substantially burdened the exercise of the inmates' religious beliefs; (3) a complete ban 
was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's interest in order and 
security; and (4) the District Court's remedial order was narrowly tailored to remedy the 
violation of inmates' rights.  Affirmed. 
59. Sharp v. Gay, No. 2:11 CV 925, 2014 WL 3556341 (D. Ariz. 2014).   
Plaintiff Gabriel Sheridan Sharp, a Mojave Indian and an inmate at the Central Arizona 
Correctional Facility (CACF), brought suit against Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona 
Department of Corrections (ADOC).  Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sharp claimed all 
defendants denied him equal protection by refusing to allow Native American inmates 
an additional weekly “turnout,” the prison’s term for a scheduled inmate religious 
activity.  Sharp also claimed that ADOC policy regarding inmate access to firewood, the 
fuel for Native American sweat ceremonies, violated RLUIPA.  The Court denied 
Sharp’s Equal Protection Clause claim but his RLUIPA claim was granted.  ADOC was 
directed to establish a group religious account.   
60. Haight, et al. v. Thompson, et al., No. 13-6005, 2014 WL 1092969, (6th 
Cir. 2014).  Death-row inmates filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for a variety of reasons – some related to 
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requests to practice their Native American faith and some related to a request for clergy 
visits.  Three inmates claimed that prison officials violated the Act by denying them 
access to a sweat lodge for religious ceremonies and refusing to provide traditional 
foods for Native American religious ceremonies. The inmates offered to pay for the 
lodge.  The state commissioner promised a decision “in the near future,” more than four 
years ago and since has not issued a decision yet.  The three inmates also requested 
Native American foods for their annual powwow.         
The District Court granted summary judgment to the prison officials on the sweat-
lodge and ceremonial-foods requests, holding that the inmates failed as a matter of law 
to support their claims under RLUIPA.  The second group of inmates contends that 
prison officials violated RLUIPA when they failed to facilitate inmate access to visiting 
clergy members.  Before June 2010, the Kentucky State Penitentiary had regularly 
granted visiting clergy members the opportunity to see prison inmates under a “special 
visit” exception to the prison visitation policy.   But the practice changed when prison 
officials discovered that it conflicted with statewide prison procedures.  The Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act prohibits state and local governments from 
placing “a substantial burden” on the “religious exercise” of any inmate unless they 
establish that the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so in 
the “least restrictive” way.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).         
The appeal presented three questions:  (1) Is there a triable issue of fact over 
whether RLUIPA gives the inmates a right to have access to a sweat lodge for faith-
based ceremonies?  (2) Is there a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives the 
inmates a right to buffalo meat and other traditional foods for a faith-based once-a-year 
powwow?  (3) Does RLUIPA permit inmates to collect money damages from prison 
officials sued in their individual capacities?          
The answers, respectively, were yes, yes and no.  RLUIPA applies to prisons 
that receive federal funds and prohibits state and local governments from placing “a 
substantial burden” on the “religious exercise” of any inmate unless they establish that 
the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so in the “least 
restrictive” way.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). To establish a cognizable claim under 
RLUIPA, the inmate must first demonstrate that a prison policy substantially burdens a 
religious practice.  So long as the practice is traceable to a sincerely held religious 
belief, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005), it does not matter 
whether the inmates' preferred exercise is “central” to his faith, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–
5(7)(A).  Once an inmate makes this showing, the prison policy survives only if it serves 
a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive way.  Id. § 2000cc–1(a).   
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61. White v. University of California, No. 12–17489, 2014 WL 4211421, 765 
F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).  Scientists brought declaratory judgment action against a 
tribal repatriation committee, university, its regents, and certain of its officials, opposing 
repatriation of aboriginal human remains that had been possessed by federally funded 
museums and educational institutions since their discovery on university property during 
archaeological field excavation project.  The District Court dismissed the complaint.  
Scientists appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) scientists had standing to bring 
action seeking a declaration that the remains were not “Native American” within 
meaning of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA); 
(2) NAGPRA did not abrogate tribes' sovereign immunity from suit; (3) the tribal 
repatriation committee was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as an arm of the tribe; 
(4) the tribal repatriation committee did not waive its sovereign immunity; (5) the tribes 
and repatriation committee were necessary parties; (6) the tribes and repatriation 
committee were indispensable parties; and (7) the public rights exception to compulsory 
joinder rule did not apply.  Affirmed 
 
J. Sovereign Immunity   
 
62. Swanda Bros., Inc. v. Chasco Constructors, Ltd., L.L.P, et al., No. 
CIV–08–199–D, 2013 WL 4520203 (W.D. Okla. 2013).  Before the Court was the 
renewed motion of Defendant Kiowa Casino Operations Authority (KCOA) to dismiss 
the claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  KCOA argued that the Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because KCOA was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from 
liability on the claims asserted by plaintiff because it was an instrumentality of the Kiowa 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (KIC).  Evidence was presented which referenced a July 9, 
2005 meeting at which the KIC considered a ballot initiative authorizing KCOA to enter 
into financing and other agreements with regard to the construction of a gaming facility.  
Because KCOA had previously represented to the Court that no election had taken 
place, the Court determined the new evidence warranted reopening the matter.  The 
Court further found that the KIC validly authorized KCOA to consent to jurisdiction in the 
state and federal courts, and to thereby waive tribal sovereign immunity, by authorizing 
it to execute agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses and/or agreements to 
consent to federal and state court jurisdiction.  The Court found that KCOA validly 
waived tribal sovereign immunity in executing the Chasco Construction Agreement.  
Accordingly, the renewed motion to dismiss was denied. 
63. Carsten v. Inter-tribal Council of Nevada et al., No. 3:12–cv–00493, 
2013 WL 4736709 (D. Nev. 2013).  Before the Court was defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.  Plaintiff was employed by ITCN as the 
program director for the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program until she was 
terminated on or about July 9, 2012.  Plaintiff alleged that, prior to termination, she had 
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a serious medical condition that made her eligible for time off under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.  Plaintiff claimed that defendants 
violated the FMLA by:  (1) refusing to let the plaintiff leave; and (2) terminating her for 
requesting leave.  Defendants argued that the ITCN is entitled to sovereign immunity.  
They moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) and 
offered affidavits in support.          
 As there is no clear waiver or congressional abrogation in this case, the question 
the Court faces is whether the ITCN, as an inter-tribal council and not a tribe itself, can 
rightfully be entitled to sovereign immunity.  Sovereign immunity is not limited to the 
tribe itself.  “When the tribe establishes an entity to conduct certain activities, the entity 
is immune if it functions as an arm of the tribe.”  Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 
1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  Sovereign immunity thus exists where 
the relevant entity’s activities can be properly attributed to the tribe.  While the Ninth 
Circuit has not ruled on whether an inter-tribal council is entitled to sovereign immunity, 
in Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998), the 
Ninth Circuit held that a non-profit inter-tribal council is properly considered a tribe for 
the purposes of the Indian tribe exception of Title VII.  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit 
looked to the reasoning in Dille v. Council of Energy Res. Tribes, 801 F.2d 373, 375–76 
(10th Cir. 1986), which held that Congress intended to exempt individual tribes and 
collective efforts by Indian tribes because “the purpose of the tribal exemption, like the 
purpose of sovereign immunity itself, was to promote the ability of Indian tribes to 
control their own enterprises.”  See Pink, 157 F.3d at 1188.  Tribal immunity extended to 
employees of a tribe “acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their 
authority.”  Cook v. AVI Casino Enter., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008).  Plaintiff 
sued Sterns and Crawford in their official capacity only.  Plaintiff argued that the FMLA 
applies to the ITCN but the Court need not reach that argument.  Absent clear waiver or 
congressional abrogation, the Court did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider this case.  The cases cited by plaintiff in support of its argument that the ITCN 
is an employer subject to the FMLA were inapplicable.  Those cases considered 
whether a general federal statute applied to a tribe or tribal entity in suits brought by the 
tribes or the federal government.  Therefore, sovereign immunity was not an issue in 
those cases.  The Court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint with prejudice and denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as moot. 
64. Martin v. Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, No. 13–CV–0143, 2013 WL 
5274236 (N.D. Okla. 2013).  (From the opinion.)  Before the Court were the Motion of 
the Defendant to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and plaintiff’s Motion for 
Leave to Amend Petition. The Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma (the Tribe), defendant, 
argued that it had not waived its sovereign immunity from suit for tort claims arising at 
its gaming facilities and that plaintiff must pursue his claim against the Tribe’s 
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subdivisions in tribal court.  Plaintiff responded that sovereign immunity was waived or 
should be treated as though it had been waived.  On October 9, 2012, Todd Martin filed 
this case in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, alleging that the Tribe 
operates the Downstream Casino and Resort (the Casino) in Ottawa County, 
Oklahoma, and that he was harmed on January 19, 2011, by a dangerous condition on 
the property when he was a Casino patron.   A compact was entered into between the 
Tribe and the State of Oklahoma regulating gaming on tribal land, entitled “Tribal–State 
Gaming Compact Between the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma and the State of Oklahoma” 
(the Compact).  The Casino is operated and managed by the Downstream Development 
Authority of the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma (Development Authority).  Because the 
Development Authority manages the Casino (and the games played within), it is the 
relevant “enterprise” under the Compact.  The Development Authority carries the 
insurance required by the Compact.  Defendant argues that plaintiff’s petition should be 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Tribe’s sovereign 
immunity.  The Compact does not unequivocally waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.  
It waives only the enterprise’s sovereign immunity, and only in limited cases.     
Because the Tribe had not consented to suit and there was no congressional 
authorization for suit, the Tribe was entitled to sovereign immunity.  Even if the 
enterprise could be sued, any such waiver of sovereign immunity was not imputed to 
the Tribe.  The petition was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
65. Sheffer, et al. v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., et al, No. 109265, 315 
P.3d 359, 2013 WL 5332615 (Okla. 2013).  The driver of a tractor trailer and 
passengers in tractor trailer sued Native American tribe and its casino under a theory of 
dram-shop liability. The parties were injured when a tractor trailer collided with the 
vehicle driven by the driver defendant. The driver of the tractor trailer was allegedly 
intoxicated from drinking alcohol at a gaming casino.  The District Court dismissed, sua 
sponte, owner, determining that existing injunctions prohibited suit for any tort claims 
against a tribe or a tribal entity.  Plaintiffs appealed.  The Supreme Court held that:  (1) 
the tribe was immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims, overruling 
Griffith v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola, 2009 OK 51, 230 P.3d 488; Dye v. Choctaw 
Casino of Pocola, 2009 OK 52, 230 P.3d 507, Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enters, 2009 
OK 6, 212 P.3d 447; (2) the tribe did not expressly waive its sovereign immunity from 
state dram shop claims when it applied for and received a state liquor license, 
overruling Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, 192 P.3d 810.  Affirmed.   
66. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians, No. 13–cv–372, 2013 WL 5803778 (W.D. Wisc. 2013).  Non-Indian 
brokerage firm and bondholders, which were involved in a commercial transaction with 
a tribal economic development corporation, brought an action seeking declaration that a 
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tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over them and an injunction preventing any 
further action by the tribe and its economic development corporation in a pending matter 
against them in that forum.  Tribal defendants moved to dismiss.  The District Court held 
that:  (1) if forum selection clauses in documents created in connection with non-
Indians’ commercial transaction with tribal economic development corporation were 
valid, exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine would not preclude federal court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the suit; (2) tribal sovereign immunity did not preclude district 
court from resolving suit; and (3) the Court would not decline to exercise declaratory 
jurisdiction over non-Indians’ suit.   
67. Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, No. 13–1438, 
2013 WL 6645395, 737 F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2013).  State brought action to enjoin Indian 
tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by Interior Secretary pursuant to 
Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act.  The District Court granted the state’s 
motion for preliminary injunction, and the tribe appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  
(1) the state’s claim that tribe’s trust submission would violate the tribal–state compact 
was barred by tribe’s sovereign immunity, and (2) the state’s claim that Indian tribe’s 
conduct of class III gaming on trust property would violate the tribal–state compact and 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was not ripe for adjudication.  Reversed. 
68. MM & A Productions, LLC v. Yavapai-Apache Nation, No. 2 CA–CV 
2013–0051, 2014 WL 185396 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).  An event production company filed 
complaint against the Indian tribe and tribe’s casino, alleging breach of exclusive 
entertainment and production agreement and associated claims.  The Superior Court, 
No. C20085949, dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Company appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the alleged apparent authority 
to waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity by signing agreement did not constitute valid 
waiver; (2) the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that further 
discovery was unnecessary to determine that agreement did not waive immunity; and 
(3) the waiver of sovereign immunity signed prior to execution of agreement was 
insufficient to waive immunity as to agreement.  Affirmed.   
69. People v. Miami Nation Enterprises, No. B242644, 2014 WL 216318 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014).  The People brought action against five payday lenders for 
injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties for violations of the Deferred Deposit 
Transaction Law (DDTL).  Two tribal entities specially appeared and moved to quash 
service of summons.  The Superior Court denied the motion.  Companies filed petition 
for writ of mandate.  The Court of Appeal denied petition.  Companies filed petition for 
review.  The Supreme Court granted petition and transferred the matter to the Court of 
Appeal.  The Court of Appeal granted petition in part and denied it in part, 169 Cal. App. 
4th 81, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572.  The Superior Court quashed service of summons and 
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dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The People appealed.  The 
Court of Appeal held that:  (1) the tribal economic development authority was protected 
by tribal sovereign immunity, and (2) the tribal corporation was protected by tribal 
sovereign immunity.  Affirmed.  
70. Bonnet v. Harvest (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., No. 12–4068, 2014 WL 292616 
(10th Cir. 2014).  Petroleum landman, and his sole proprietorship, brought action 
against various companies and individuals arising from Tribe’s termination of his 
contract to provide independent consultant services.  Plaintiff served Tribe with 
non-party subpoena duces tecum requesting documents.  The District Court, 2012 WL 
994403, denied the Tribe’s motion to quash based on tribal immunity.  Tribe appealed.  
The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the denial of motion to quash based on tribal 
immunity was an immediately appealable collateral order, and (2) as matter of first 
impression in Circuit, the subpoena itself was “suit” against Tribe triggering tribal 
sovereign immunity.  Reversed. 
71. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 13–2498, 2014 WL 702193 (1st Cir. 
2014).  Government moved to compel compliance by Indian tribe’s historic preservation 
office with subpoena duces tecum that was issued by since-defunct grand jury, 
representing that investigation had been transferred to a newly-empanelled grand jury.  
The preservation office objected and moved to quash subpoena on grounds of tribal 
sovereign immunity and unreasonableness.  After granting the motion to compel and 
issuing a show cause order due to preservation office’s noncompliance, the District 
Court held the preservation office in civil contempt.  Preservation office appealed.  The 
Appellate Court held that:  (1) the subpoena could not be enforced by civil contempt 
sanctions after expiration of issuing grand jury; (2) the exception to mootness doctrine 
applied to warrant review of preservation office’s additional challenges to subpoena; 
(3) tribal sovereign immunity provided no refuge from subpoena power of federal grand 
jury; and (4) denial of motion to quash subpoena as unreasonable was not abuse of 
discretion.  Vacated. 
72. City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, No. 
A12–1324, 2014 WL 949284, 843 N.W. 2d 577 (Minn. 2014).   (from the opinion) In 
April 2012, respondent City of Duluth (the City) commenced an action in state District 
Court against appellant Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band), 
alleging breach of a 1986 contract regarding a casino in Duluth.  The District Court 
dismissed the lawsuit after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
the Band had only consented to suit in Federal Court in a 1994 agreement amending 
the 1986 contract.  The Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that Minnesota 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.  The Court granted review and 
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reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the District Court’s judgment for 
the Band.   
73. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of South Florida v. Bermudez, No. 3D13–
2153, 2014 WL 2965411, 143 So. 3d 157 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014).  The Miccosukee Tribe 
of Indians of South Florida appeals from a final judgment of $4.1 million.  This matter 
began when Carlos Bermudez sued two members of the Tribe, Tammy Gwen Billie and 
Jimmie Bert, for damages resulting from an automobile accident in which a car driven 
by Billie and owned by Bert crashed into Bermudez’s car, killing Bermudez’s wife and 
injuring Bermudez and his son.  Following a jury verdict, a final judgment was entered 
against Billie and Bert for $3.177 million.  The Tribe was not a party when the final 
judgment was entered.  Bermudez has yet to collect the judgment, as Billie and Bert 
assert they have no assets.  Several years after the first final judgment was entered, 
Bermudez filed a motion to add the Tribe as a judgment debtor in the matter because 
the Tribe had funded and guided Billie and Bert’s defense in the lawsuit.  The Tribe 
objected on several grounds, including sovereign immunity.  Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting Bermudez’s motion and the Trial 
Court accordingly entered a second final judgment in favor of Bermudez and solely 
against the Tribe for the full amount of the original final judgment, plus interest, for a 
total judgment of just over $4.1 million.          
That final judgment did not reference the earlier final judgment against Billie and 
Bert, which remains in effect.  This appeal followed.  Because Bermudez had not 
established some cognizable legal basis to add the Tribe as a judgment debtor, the 
Court did not address the Tribe’s claim of sovereign immunity.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
74. Black v. U.S., No. C13–5415, 2014 WL 3337466 (W.D. Wash. 2014).  
Before the Court was the Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendants Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, Suquamish Tribal Police, Port Gamble S’Klallam Indian Tribe (PGST), PGST 
Tribal Police (collectively, Tribes), PGST Detective Greg Graves, and 25 John Doe 
Officers.  The Tribes contended that tribal sovereign immunity shielded them and their 
officers from suit in federal court.  Plaintiff Sherri Black claimed that neither the Tribes, 
nor their officers, were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because they were acting 
under the color of state law when they entered the Blacks’ home, or alternatively, that 
they waived this immunity through treaty.          
In December 2011, Suquamish and Port S’Klallam tribal police officers jointly 
executed a tribe-issued misdemeanor arrest warrant for PGST member Stacy Stanley 
Callihoo.  Shortly after he entered the home, Tribal Officer Greg Graves shot Thomas 
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Black five times as he was lying on a couch.  The unique complexities of tribal 
sovereignty rendered the Court an inappropriate forum for Ms. Black to seek relief 
against the Indian tribes themselves.  Her Complaint’s allegations failed to strip the 
Tribes of their sovereign immunity.  Black pleaded sufficient facts to state a viable 
§ 1983 claim against the tribal police acting in their individual capacities, under color of 
state law.  For these reasons, defendant Tribes’ Motion to Dismiss Black’s claims 
against the Suquamish and Port Gamble S’Klallam Indian Tribes for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction was granted.  Black’s Motion to Amend was denied, so her only 
remaining claims against tribal Defendants were against Greg Graves.      
The Motion to Dismiss Black’s claims against Graves was denied. 
75. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca Cnty, N.Y., No. 12–3723, 
2014 WL 3746795, __ F.3d __ (2nd Cir. 2014).  A Native-American tribe brought action 
seeking permanent declaratory and injunctive relief against the county’s attempts to 
collect property taxes on five parcels of land purchased by tribe.  The District Court, 890 
F. Supp. 2d 240, granted the tribe’s motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
county from foreclosing on properties pursuant to New York law.  County appealed.  
The Appellate Court held that tribal sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit.  
Affirmed. 
76. Chavez v. Morongo Casino Resort & Spa, No. E056191, 2014 WL 
4053805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).  Six former employees of Morongo Casino Resort & Spa 
(Employees) are non-Indians who were employed by Morongo in the security 
department.  Employees were terminated at different times during the years 2010 and 
2011.  Employees sued (1) Morongo Casino Resort & Spa (Morongo), also known as 
Morongo Gaming Agency, and also known as Morongo Band of Mission Indians; 
(2) Jerry Schultze, the Executive Director for the Morongo Gaming Agency; as well as 
(3) various Morongo management members, for (1) retaliation based upon 
discrimination; (2) discrimination; (3) age discrimination; (4) sexual discrimination; 
(5) harassment, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); 
(6) wrongful termination, in violation of FEHA and public policy; (7) failure to prevent 
workplace discrimination; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) negligent 
infliction of emotional distress; (10) defamation; and (11) breach of contract.  The Trial 
Court ordered the complaint and service of the summons be quashed because the Trial 
Court lacked jurisdiction over Morongo, due to Morongo being “immune to unconsented” 
lawsuits, and not having consented to Employees’ suit.  Therefore, the Trial Court 
ordered the Employees’ lawsuit dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend.    
On appeal Employees contended the Trial Court erred because 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1360 abrogated Morongo’s sovereign immunity in relation to civil claims.  Second, in 
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the alternative, Employees asserted the Trial Court erred because, in Morongo’s 2008 
Amended Compact with the State of California, Morongo expressly agreed to waive its 
sovereign immunity in relation to bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury 
arising out of operating the casino.  Third, Employees asserted the Trial Court erred by 
(a) preventing Employees from petitioning the court for an order compelling arbitration, 
and (b) not ordering the parties to participate in arbitration.  Morongo and the individual 
defendants specially appeared at the Trial Court, moving the court to quash the 
complaint and service of summons because “Morongo Band is a federally-recognized 
American Indian tribe [citation] that is immune from unconsented suit and has not 
consented either to the creation of the purported causes of action alleged against it or to 
this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate those purported causes of action against any of the 
defendants . . . .”  Morongo asserted the individual defendants were sued in their official 
capacities, and thus were “cloaked with the Morongo Band’s sovereign immunity,” and 
therefore were also not subject to the Trial Court’s jurisdiction.  Morongo argued that it 
could only be subject to the Trial Court’s jurisdiction if it expressly waived its sovereign 
immunity, and no waiver was made that would allow for jurisdiction in Employees’ 
lawsuit.  The appellate affirmed the judgment.  
77. Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, No. 13–13886, 2014 WL 4085819, 
578 Fed. Appx. 801 (11th Cir. 2014).  Stephanie Mastro appealed the District Court's 
dismissal of her amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to 
state a claim.  Ms. Mastro, formerly employed as a card dealer at Seminole Indian 
Casino—Immokalee, sued the Seminole Tribe of Florida, d/b/a Seminole Indian 
Casino—Immokalee, for gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Florida Civil Rights Act.  The Tribe moved to 
dismiss, arguing that Ms. Mastro failed to state a claim and that the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe and Casino were entitled to tribal immunity.  
The District Court agreed and granted the Tribe's motion.  It held that, because 
Congress did not abrogate tribal immunity with regard to Title VII, sovereign immunity 
barred Ms. Mastro's claims against the Tribe.  It likewise extended this logic to shield 
the Casino; it concluded that because it was wholly owned, operated by the Tribe, and 
formed pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Casino constituted a 
subordinate arm of the Tribe and was therefore immune from suit.  The District Court's 
dismissal of Ms. Mastro's complaint was affirmed.   
78. Outsource Services Mgmt, LLC v. Nooksack Bus. Corp., No. 88482–0, 
2014 WL 4108073, 181 P.3d 272 (Wash. 2014).  Washington State courts have 
jurisdiction over civil cases arising on Indian reservations as long as they do not infringe 
on the sovereignty of the tribe.  At issue in this case is whether Washington State courts 
have jurisdiction over a civil case arising out of a contract in which the tribal corporation 
waived its sovereign immunity and consented to jurisdiction in Washington State courts.  
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Nooksack Business Corporation (Nooksack), a tribal enterprise of the Nooksack Indian 
Tribe, signed a contract with Outsource Services Management LLC to finance the 
renovation and expansion of its casino.  The contract contained a clause related to 
sovereign immunity and jurisdiction.   
 
Outsource and Nooksack executed three successive forbearance agreements, 
but after Nooksack failed to make required payments, Outsource filed suit in Whatcom 
County Superior Court for breach of the loan agreement.  Nooksack acknowledged that 
it had waived sovereign immunity but argued that nonetheless, Whatcom County 
Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case because it involved 
a contractual dispute with a tribal enterprise that occurred on tribal land.  The Trial Court 
denied Nooksack's motion to dismiss, ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction 
because Nooksack both waived sovereign immunity and consented to the jurisdiction of 
Washington State courts.  The Trial Court also certified its order for interlocutory appeal.  
Nooksack appealed, and the Court of Appeals found that review of the jurisdictional 
issue was justified.  The Court of Appeals issued a broader holding than the Trial Court, 
concluding that the waiver of sovereign immunity alone was sufficient to give the 
Superior Court subject matter jurisdiction in the case.  Nooksack petitioned for review, 
which was granted.  The Supreme Court addressed the broad scope of the Court of 
Appeals opinion, which held that Nooksack's waiver of sovereign immunity was enough 
– in and of itself – to confer subject matter jurisdiction on Washington State courts.    
Such a broad holding is not necessary to resolve this case, where Nooksack both 
waived sovereign immunity and consented to state court jurisdiction.  The issue of 
whether state court jurisdiction can be based solely on a waiver of sovereign immunity 
is not presented in this case, and thus we take no position on it.  The Court found that 
Nooksack consensually entered into a contract in which it waived sovereign immunity 
and consented to the jurisdiction of Washington State courts.  It held that State Court 
jurisdiction does not infringe on tribal sovereignty.  The Court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals.   
K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent   
79. North Cent. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. North Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm’n, et 
al., No. 20130075, 837 N.W. 2d 138, 2013 WL 4714327 (N.D. 2013).  Electric utility 
appealed order of the Public Service Commission, dismissing utility’s complaint 
challenging competing electric utility’s extension of electric service to a facility owned by 
Indian tribe on tribal trust land within Indian reservation.  The District Court affirmed the 
Commission order, and utility appealed.  The Supreme Court held that Commission 
lacked authority to regulate the tribe’s decision to have competing utility provide electric 
service to a tribal-owned facility on tribal-owned land within the reservation.  Affirmed. 
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80. St. Isidore Farm LLC, et al. v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Indians, et al., 
No. 2:13–CV–00274, 2013 WL 4782140 (D. Idaho 2013).  Plaintiffs St. Isidore Farm, 
LLC and Gobers, LLC asked the Court to enjoin and restrain the Coeur d’Alene Tribe of 
Indians and the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court from levying civil fines, placing liens on the 
real property owned by Plaintiff St. Isidore Farm LLC and pursuing criminal actions 
against the Plaintiffs for the land application of domestic sewage sludge (septage) to 
non public contact sites from which there is no discharge into waterways.  Plaintiffs 
alleged they are in compliance with all federal and state regulations for the discharge of 
septage and received approval from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality for 
human waste application on the non-Indian fee land.  It is undisputed that the Tribe 
adopted a resolution on March 6, 2013, enacting Chapter 57 of the Coeur d’Alene Tribal 
Code entitled “Tribal Waste Management Act” which appears to prohibit the septage 
disposal process being used by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs argued the Tribe’s more restrictive 
discharge provisions were not applicable to non Indian land owned by non Indians 
located within the boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  Plaintiffs alleged they 
were being fined by the Tribe for their actions and were facing criminal liability as well 
as liens being placed on their property for not being in compliance with the Tribe’s laws 
and regulations.  Plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief in this Court to enjoin the 
defendants from attempting to enforce Tribal ordinances against them.  The Tribe filed 
suit in Tribal Court against the Plaintiffs on June 3, 2013.  Plaintiffs appeared and 
answered the Complaint in Tribal Court, but contest the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over 
this matter.  Defendants filed declarations indicating that no criminal prosecutions have 
been initiated against Plaintiffs.  The Court granted defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as 
Plaintiffs must first exhaust their claims in Tribal Court before coming to Federal Court.  
The Court found that the matter is administratively terminated with leave granted to the 
parties move to reopen this matter if the Tribal Court determines it does not have 
jurisdiction over the actions.   
81. In re Estate of Gopher, No. DA 12–0719, __ P.3d __, 2013 WL 5205233 
(Mont. 2013).  Son of mother, an enrolled member of Indian tribe who died intestate, 
filed application for informal probate proceedings.  Son’s siblings filed motion to dismiss, 
asserting that jurisdiction over the matter lay with the Tribal Court.  The District Court 
denied motion and imposed a constructive trust on mother’s estate.  Siblings appealed.  
The Supreme Court held that District Court’s assumption of subject matter jurisdiction 
over mother’s estate did not unlawfully infringe on tribe’s right of tribal self-government.  
Affirmed. 
82. Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, No. 13-35003, 
2013 WL 6284359 (9th Cir. 2013).  Property owner, contractor, and subcontractor 
commenced action against Indian tribe, seeking declaratory judgment that tribal court 
lacked jurisdiction over his construction of single family dwelling within reservation and 
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preliminary injunction barring further tribal court proceedings against them.  The District 
Court, 2012 WL 6651194, dismissed action.  Plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court 
held that:  (1) construction of single-family house on land owned in fee simple by non-
Indian in area that already had seen comparable development on reservation did not 
threaten or have any direct effect on political integrity, economic security, or health or 
welfare of tribe and (2) construction did not pose catastrophic risks, and thus tribe did 
not have authority over nonmember’s construction.  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded.  
83. Belcourt Pub. School Dist. v. Davis, Nos. 4:12–cv–114, 4:12–cv–115, 
4:12-cv-116, 4:12–cv–117, 4:12–cv–118, 2014 WL 458075 (D.N.D. 2014).  A number 
of lawsuits have been commenced against the Belcourt Public School District (“School 
District”) and its employees in Turtle Mountain Tribal Court.  The Turtle Mountain Tribal 
Court of Appeals has concluded that jurisdiction properly lies in tribal court.  The School 
District commenced actions, seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction 
over the School District and its employees.  The limited jurisdictional issue before this 
Court was whether a state political subdivision may be subjected to suit in a tribal forum 
when it enters into a consensual agreement with a tribe to operate a high school on 
tribal trust land.  The Court found that Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. 
Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) is inapplicable when determining the adjudicatory 
authority over nonmembers who consensually agree to operate and conduct business in 
conjunction with the tribe on tribal trust land.  Even if Montana applies, the result would 
be the same.  The “first exception” in Montana allows tribal courts to exercise 
jurisdiction when a nonmember has entered into a consensual relationship with a tribe 
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.  
This case fits squarely within the plain language of the exception.  The Court denied 
Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and remanded the cases to the Turtle 
Mountain Tribal Court for consideration on the merits.   
84. Fort Yates Public School Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., No. 
1:12-cv-135, 2014 WL 458054, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D.N.D. 2014).  Plaintiff Fort 
Yates Public School District #4 (“School District) filed a Complaint against Jamie 
Murphy for C.M.B. (a minor) and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court seeking declaratory 
relief in the form of an Order declaring that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court lacked 
jurisdiction over public school districts and school district employees acting in their 
official capacity, and an injunction prohibiting tribal court from adjudicating the claims 
brought against the school by Jamie Murphy on behalf of her daughter C.M.B.  Pending 
before the Court was a motion by defendant Jamie Murphy to dismiss the action under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7).  The limited jurisdictional issue before the Court was whether a 
state political subdivision may be subjected to suit in a tribal forum when it enters into a 
consensual agreement with a tribe to operate a school on tribal trust land.  The Court 
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found that Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 
(1981) was inapplicable when determining the adjudicatory authority over nonmembers 
who consensually agreed to operate and conduct business in conjunction with the tribe 
on tribal trust land.  Even if Montana applied, the result would be the same.  The “first 
exception” in Montana allowed tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction when a nonmember 
entered into a consensual relationship with a tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.  The Court found that Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribal Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the School District, 
whether the framework set forth in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. 
Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) applied or not and that the record was sufficiently 
developed to decide the jurisdictional issue.  The Court dismissed the action and 
remanded the case to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court for consideration on the 
merits.  Jamie Murphy’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) was dismissed as moot.   
85. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 12–
60668, 2014 WL 994936, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).  (From the opinion.)  The Court 
previously issued its opinion in this case on October 3, 2013.  Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. 
Band of Choctaw Indians, 732 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2013).  We hereby withdraw the 
previous opinion and substitute the following.  Dolgencorp, Inc. and Dollar General 
Corp. (collectively “Dolgencorp”) brought an action in the District Court seeking to enjoin 
John Doe, a member of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and other defendants 
(collectively “the tribal defendants”) from adjudicating tort claims against Dolgencorp in 
the Choctaw tribal court.  The District Court denied Dolgencorp’s motion for summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the tribal defendants, concluding 
that the Tribal Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over Doe’s claims.  Because the 
Court agreed that Dolgencorp’s consensual relationship with Doe gave rise to Tribal 
Court jurisdiction over Doe’s claims under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
564-66 (1981), the Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 
86. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, No. 2:13–CV–02000, 
2014 WL 1199593 (D. Nev. 2014).  After Tribal Court of Appeals ruled that the Indian 
Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over the defendant, who had been a member of the 
Tribe before being disenrolled, the Tribe brought action seeking declaratory judgment 
that it could assert criminal jurisdiction over any person satisfying the definition of 
“Indian” under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), including the defendant.  The 
defendant failed to appear, and the Tribe moved for summary judgment.  The District 
Court held that:  (1) the Indian Tribe had authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over any 
person qualifying as an Indian under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), so long as it 
proved the defendant’s Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, but (2) the Tribal 
Court erred in declaring the defendant to be an Indian for purposes of tribal criminal 
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jurisdiction without submitting the question to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Motion granted in part and denied in part. 
87. Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09–CV–1015, 2014 WL 1338170 (W.D. Mich. 
2014).  (From the opinion.)  The issue in this case was whether a Tribal Court has 
jurisdiction over a misdemeanor crime between an accused Indian perpetrator, the 
Petitioner Norbert J. Kelsey, that allegedly occurred during a tribal meeting in a building 
owned by the tribe but located off the tribe's reservation and wherein the alleged victim 
was also a tribal member.  The Magistrate Judge opined in a Report and 
Recommendation that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes outside 
of Indian country, and also found that Kelsey's due process rights were violated when 
the tribal court expanded its jurisdiction in the criminal ordinance.  The Court agrees 
with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction in this 
case.  This conclusion is supported by Supreme Court precedent, as well as the 
legislative framework for concurrent jurisdiction in Indian country.  Accordingly, the 
Court granted the Petition for Habeas Corpus. 
88. State v. Lang, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0629, 2014 WL 1691613, 323 P.3d 457 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).  State Bar brought action against nonmember, alleging 
unauthorized practice of law.  The Superior Court, Maricopa County, No. CV2009–
012054, granted State Bar's motion for summary judgment and entered permanent 
injunction restraining nonmember from performing acts constituting the practice of law in 
Arizona.  Nonmember appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the nonmember, 
who had a law degree and was admitted to practice law in tribal court, engaged in 
unauthorized practice of law in representation of three clients; (2) injunction was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad in restricting nonmember from maintaining a business 
address for a law practice anywhere within state of Arizona other than within boundaries 
of a tribal jurisdiction in which he was admitted to practice; and (3) the injunction was 
not unconstitutionally overbroad in barring nonmember from referring to himself as a 
“J.D.” or “attorney” and required him to disclaim State Bar membership in his letterhead 
and advertising material.  Affirmed. 
89. Billie v. Stier, No. 3D13–3180, 2014 WL 1613661(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014).  (From the opinion.)  “This Petition for a Writ of Prohibition evolves out of a 
custody dispute between the mother, who was a member of the Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, and the father, who was not a member of the tribe or of Native American 
heritage.  The issue was whether the Miccosukee Tribal Court or the Circuit Court of the 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit had the jurisdiction to decide the custody dispute.  The mother 
petitioned for a writ prohibiting the Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction over the 
custody matter.  Based on the facts of this case and the Uniform Child Custody, 
Jurisdiction, and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), the Court concluded that the Circuit 
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Court was correct in determining that it, and not the Tribal Court, has jurisdiction to 
decide the custody issues and we therefore deny the petition.  
90. Simmonds v. Parks, No. S–14103, 2014 WL 3537863, 329 P.3d 995, 
(Alaska 2014).  A father, whose parental rights were terminated by the Minto Tribal 
Court, filed a complaint with the Alaska Superior Court requesting physical custody of 
child.  The Superior Court concluded that the Minto Tribal Court’s judgment was not 
entitled to full faith and credit because the father had been denied minimum due 
process.  Foster parents filed petition for review.  The Supreme Court granted the 
petition and remanded the case.  On remand, the Superior Court concluded that it was 
not harmless error for the Minto Tribal Court to have failed to provide a meaningful 
opportunity for father to challenge Minto’s jurisdiction over him.  Foster parents filed 
petition for review.  The Supreme Court held that:  (1) because the father failed to 
exhaust available tribal court remedies by appealing to the Minto Court of Appeals, the 
father was not permitted to relitigate his minimum due process and jurisdictional claims, 
and therefore, the Supreme Court would accord full faith and credit to the Minto Tribal 
Court’s judgment terminating father’s parental rights, and (2) the Indian Child Welfare 
Act’s (ICWA) full faith and credit mandate applied to the Minto Tribal Court’s order which 
terminated the parental rights of parents of Indian child.   
91. Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, No. 12–2617, 2014 WL 4116804, 
764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014).  Deborah Jackson, Linda Gonnella, and James Binkowski 
(collectively “the Plaintiffs”) initially brought this action in Illinois state court against 
Payday Financial, LLC, and other defendant entities owned by, or doing business with, 
Martin A. Webb, an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.  The Plaintiffs 
alleged violations of Illinois civil and criminal statutes related to loans that they had 
received from the Loan Entities.  After the Loan Entities removed the case to the District 
Court, that court granted the Loan Entities' motion to dismiss for improper venue under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).  It held that the loan agreements required that 
all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation, located within the geographic 
boundaries of South Dakota.  The Plaintiffs timely appealed.  Following oral argument, 
the Appellate Court ordered a limited remand to the District Court for further factual 
findings concerning (1) whether the tribal law was readily available to the litigants and 
(2) whether the arbitration under the auspices of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, as set 
forth in the loan documents, was available to the parties.  The District Court concluded 
that, although the tribal law could be ascertained, the arbitral mechanism detailed in the 
agreement did not exist.  Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the 
Plaintiffs' action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism 
specified in the agreement is illusory.  The Court cannot accept the Loan Entities' 
alternative argument for upholding the District Court's dismissal: that the loan 
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documents required any litigation to be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe Reservation.  As the Supreme Court explained most recently in Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 128 S. Ct. 2709, 171 
L. Ed. 2d 457 (2008), tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not 
extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate 
the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands.  The Loan Entities have not 
established a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, and, therefore, exhaustion in tribal 
courts is not required.  The arbitration provision contained in the loan agreements is 
unreasonable and substantively and procedurally unconscionable under federal, state, 
and tribal law.  The District Court, therefore, erred in granting the Defendants' motion to 
dismiss for improper venue based on that provision.  Additionally, the courts of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' 
claims.  Nor have the defendants raised a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction necessary 
to invoke the rule of tribal exhaustion.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the District 
Court. 
L. Tax 
92. State ex rel. Wasden v. Native Wholesale Supply Co., No. 38780, 2013 
WL 5642799, 312 P.3d 1257 (Idaho 2013).  The state brought an action against an out-
of-state Indian-owned wholesaler for operating as a cigarette wholesaler without a 
permit and for selling cigarettes that were unlawful for sale in Idaho.  The District Court 
enjoined the wholesaler from selling wholesale cigarettes without a wholesale permit 
and assessed civil penalties.  Wholesaler appealed.  The Supreme Court held that:  
(1) the wholesaler was not required to obtain wholesaler permit; (2) the State had 
subject matter jurisdiction to prevent non-compliant cigarettes from being imported; 
(3) the Indian Commerce Clause did not preclude regulation; (4) the Trial Court had 
personal jurisdiction over wholesaler pursuant to long-arm statute; and (5) the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction comported with due process.  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
93. HCI Distribution, Inc. v. New York State Police, 2013 WL 5745376 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013).  Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, which granted 
petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to direct immediate 
release of seized property.  Petitioner is an “economic and political subdivision” of a 
federally recognized Indian tribe located in Nebraska.  In January 2012, petitioner 
purchased, among other things, more than 26,000 cartons of cigarettes and cigars from 
a manufacturer located on the St. Regis Mohawk Indian Reservation in St. Lawrence 
County and owned by the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe.  The tobacco products were then 
consigned to a common carrier to be delivered to petitioner in Nebraska.  During 
transport, the truck carrying the cigarettes was stopped at a United States Border Patrol 
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checkpoint in St. Lawrence County and the Border Patrol authorities contacted the New 
York State Police.  The Court found that inasmuch as petitioner demonstrated neither a 
clear legal right to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition nor the absence of an 
adequate alternative remedy, the petition must be dismissed.  The judgment was 
reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition was dismissed. 
94. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and 
Trade Bureau, No. 11-3038, 2014 WL 267160, 996 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D. Wash. 
2014).  An Indian tribe, tribal corporation, and tribe member brought action seeking 
declaratory judgment that the corporation was not subject to payment of excise taxes on 
tobacco products, a declaration that the tribe was entitled to meaningful consultation 
and resolution of disputes with executive branch, and an injunction prohibiting Alcohol 
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) from preventing sale of corporation’s 
products.  United States moved for summary judgment.  The District Court held that:  
(1) the tobacco products were subject to federal excise tax; (2) the 1855 Yakama Treaty 
did not exempt tribal corporation’s manufactured tobacco products from federal excise 
taxes; and (3) the provision of Internal Revenue Code exempting articles of native 
Indian handicraft did not exempt manufactured tobacco products.  Motion granted. 
95. Smith v. Parker, No. 4:07CV3101, 2014 WL 558965, 996 F. Supp. 
2d 815, (D. Neb. 2014).  Owners of businesses and clubs that sold alcoholic beverages 
brought action against Omaha Tribal Council members in their official capacities for 
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief from the tribe’s attempt to enforce its liquor-
license and tax scheme on owners.  The state of Nebraska and the United States 
intervened.  Parties cross-moved for summary judgment.  The District Court held that 
the Omaha Reservation was not diminished by the 1882 Act ratifying agreement for sale 
of tribal lands to non-Indian settlers.  The plaintiffs’ motion denied; defendants’ motion 
granted. 
96. U.S. v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians, No. C13–5122, 2014 WL 1386553 
(W.D. Wash. 2014).  This matter was before the Court on plaintiff United States of 
America's (“Government”) motion for summary judgment and defendant Puyallup Tribe 
of Indians' (“Tribe”) motion for summary judgment.  The Government filed a complaint 
against the Tribe asserting a claim for the alleged failure to honor an Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) Tax Levy.  Joshua D. Turnipseed (“Turnipseed”) is an enrolled member 
of the Tribe and owed back taxes to the Government.  The Tribe, at the Tribal Council's 
discretion, distributes per capita payments each month to qualified members such as 
Turnipseed.  The Government issued a levy to the Tribe for Turnipseed's wages, salary, 
or other income in an attempt to collect Turnipseed's liabilities.  The Tribe issued per 
capita payments to Turnipseed despite the levy, and the Government filed this action.  
The parties disputed whether the per capita payments were “property” or “rights to 
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property” and whether the per capita payments were “fixed and determinable” under 
federal law.  The parties also disputed the applicable law (state, tribal, or federal) and 
the characterization of future per capita payments.  The Court granted the Tribe's 
motion for summary judgment and denied the Government's motion for summary 
judgment. 
97. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, No. 13–10566, 
2014 WL 1760855, 750 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2014).  An Indian tribe brought an action 
seeking declaratory judgment that the tribe was exempt from paying state tax on fuel 
and injunction requiring refund of taxes paid.  The District Court, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 
dismissed the complaint, and the tribe appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the 
state's sovereign immunity barred action, and (2) the action did not fall within scope of 
Ex parte Young exception to state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Affirmed. 
98. State, ex rel. Pruitt v. Native Wholesale Supply, No. 111985, 2014 WL 
2620019, 338 P.3d 613 (Okla. 2014).  Attorney General initiated proceeding against 
cigarette importer and distributor, which was a tribally-chartered corporation wholly 
owned by an individual of Native American ancestry, alleging violations of the Oklahoma 
Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act.  The importer/distributor filed a 
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.  
The District Court denied the motion as to personal jurisdiction, but granted motion upon 
finding that enforcement of the Complementary Act against importer/distributor would 
have violated the Indian Commerce Clause, depriving the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Both parties appealed.  The Supreme Court, 237 P.3d 199, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded.  On remand, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Attorney General.  Importer/distributor appealed.  The Supreme 
Court held that:  (1) the district court was bound on remand by facts supporting 
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional holdings in previous appeal; (2) the importer/distributor 
was not entitled to jury trial; and (3) the importer/distributor’s actions violated the 
Oklahoma Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act.  Affirmed. 
99. Westmoreland Resources Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. DA 13–0547, 
2014 WL 3842978, 330 P.3d 1188 (Mont. 2014).  Coal producer and Department of 
Revenue filed joint petition for interlocutory adjudication of substantive question of law, 
requesting determination as to whether it was proper to have deduction taken from the 
producer for coal severance and gross proceeds taxes paid to Indian tribe, as owner of 
coal, to reduce the amount owning under Resource Indemnity Trust and Ground Water 
Assessment Tax.  The First Judicial District Court held in favor of Department.  
Producer appealed.  The Supreme Court held that taxes that producer paid to tribe were 
not taxes paid on production subject to deduction from contract sales price.  Affirmed. 
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M. Trust Breach and Claims 
100. Klamath Claims Comm. v. U.S., No. 2012–5130, 2013 WL 4494383 
(Fed. Cir. 2013).  The Klamath Claims Committee (KCC) appealed two judgments of the 
Court of Federal Claims.  The first was the Court’s decision to dismiss the third and 
fourth claims of the KCC’s first amended complaint pursuant to Rule 19 of the Court of 
Federal Claims.  The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment.  The second was the 
Court’s dismissal of the KCC’s motion seeking leave to amend its complaint for the 
second time.  The Court affirmed that decision, but write briefly to address its reasoning 
for doing so.  The Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians 
comprise one federally-recognized tribal government (the “Tribes”).  Pursuant to its 
constitution and by-laws, the Tribes passed a resolution in 1952 to create the KCC.  At 
that time, the Tribes anticipated the termination of its federal recognition, which later 
occurred through the Klamath Termination Act of 1954.  The KCC’s purpose was to 
represent the interests of the Tribes’ final enrollees (the “1954 Enrollees”) in claims 
against the United States filed before and after termination.  A “reserve of necessary 
funds for prosecution” of such claims (the “Litigation Fund”) was created in 1958 from 
monies due under the Termination Act.  In 1986, the Tribes regained federal recognition 
under the Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act.  After the federally-recognized 
sovereignty of the Tribes was restored, the KCC continued to exist.  The Tribal Council 
(the elected governmental body for the Tribes) appears to have supervised the KCC’s 
post-restoration activities, including the disbursement of money from the Litigation Fund.  
The present suit began with a complaint filed by the KCC in February 2009.  An 
amended complaint included four claims.  The first two alleged wrongdoings by the 
government related to funds payable to the Tribes and its members under Section 13 of 
the Termination Act.  The third and fourth claims asserted a taking of private property 
and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the removal of the Chiloquin Dam – an act that 
allegedly affected water flow and fishing in waterways used by the Tribes.  Shortly after 
the amended complaint was filed, the government moved to dismiss all four claims, 
arguing that the KCC lacked standing to bring its claims.  It asserted that the KCC did 
not have a legally cognizable interest in the Section 13 funds, the Chiloquin Dam, or the 
tribal water and fishing rights that were apparently affected by the dam’s removal.    
According to the government, the KCC failed to show that “it, instead of the 
Tribes, [was] the proper entity to assert [its] claims.”   Shortly after the KCC filed its 
motion to amend, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that dismissal under Rule 19 was 
appropriate because the Tribes was an indispensable party for the third and fourth 
claims of the amended complaint.  In addition to citing concerns and respect for the 
Tribes’ sovereignty and the risk of “multiple and conflicting claims” against the 
government, the Court reasoned that the resolution of the third and fourth claims in the 
amended complaint required adjudication of substantial tribal interests in water and 
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fishing rights that “might be impaired by an adverse ruling.”  The KCC filed a timely 
appeal.   Applying Rule 19 factors here, the Court held that the Tribes were an 
indispensable party for the claims the KCC sought to add in its motion to amend.  The 
Tribes were clearly a required party for those claims, and the first Rule 19 factor 
weighed quite heavily in favor of dismissal.  The resolution of the KCC’s new claims 
would necessarily implicate significant sovereign interests of the Tribes and risk 
substantial prejudice to it.   
101. Fletcher v. United States, No. 12–5078, 2013 WL 5184985 (10th Cir. 
2013).  Tribal members brought an action against the federal government, seeking an 
accounting to determine whether the federal government had fulfilled the fiduciary 
obligations it chose to assume, as trustee, to oversee the collection of royalty income 
from oil and gas reserves and its distribution to tribal members.  The District Court, 2012 
WL 1109090, dismissed the tribal members’ claims, and they appealed.  The Appellate 
Court held that American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act imposed on the 
federal government a duty to provide an accounting of royalty income from oil and gas 
reserves held in trust and its distribution to tribal members.  Reversed and remanded.   
102. Wolfchild, et al. v. U.S., Nos. 2012–5035, 2012–5036, 2012–5043, 2013 
WL 5405505 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  (From the opinion.)  The United States currently holds 
certain tracts of land in Minnesota in trust for three Indian communities.  It originally 
acquired some of that land in the late 1800s, using funds appropriated by Congress to 
help support a statutorily identified group of Indians, and held it for the benefit of those 
Indians and their descendants for decades.  As time passed, that beneficiary group and 
the three present-day communities that grew on these lands overlapped but diverged:  
many of the beneficiary group were part of the communities, but many were not; and the 
communities included many outside the beneficiary group.  In 1980, Congress 
addressed the resulting land use problems by putting the lands into trust for the three 
communities that had long occupied them.  Ever since, proceeds earned from the 
lands—including profits from gaming—have gone to the same three communities.  The 
discrepancy between the makeup of the three communities and the collection of 
descendants of the Indians designated in the original appropriations acts underlies the 
present dispute, which was before this court once before.  Claimants alleged that they 
belonged to the latter group and that they, rather than the communities, held rights to 
the land at issue and any money generated from it.  Four years ago, based on an 
extensive analysis of the relevant laws and history, the Court rejected what was then 
the only live claim, which got to the heart of their assertion:  that the appropriations acts 
created a trust for the benefit of the statutorily designated Indians and their 
descendants.  Wolfchild v.. United States, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  On remand, 
claimants advanced several new claims, some of which seek proceeds generated from 
the lands, others of which seek more.  Again unable to find that claimants have stated a 
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claim that meets the standards of governing law, we now reject these new claims, 
including the one that the Court of Federal Claims held valid in the judgment the Courts 
reviewed.  We therefore reversed the Claims Court’s judgment against the United 
States on the claim to pre 1980 money and affirmed its judgment against claimants on 
the remainder of the proposed claims.   
103. Hopi Tribe v. United States, No. 12–45, 2013 WL 5496957 (Fed. Cl. 
2013).  Plaintiff, an Indian tribe, brought suit to recover damages for breach of trust.  
The alleged breach consisted of defendant’s supposed failure to ensure that the water 
supply on the plaintiff’s reservation contained safe levels of arsenic.  Before the Court 
was the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in which the 
defendant asserted that the plaintiff failed to identify an applicable fiduciary duty.  
Plaintiff was a federally recognized Indian Tribe residing on the Hopi Reservation (the 
“Reservation”) in Arizona.  Although the land was uninhabitable without drinking water, 
the public water systems serving villages on the eastern portion of the Reservation 
contained levels of arsenic higher than what Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
regulations permit.  Plaintiff brought this suit claiming that defendant, through the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) committed a breach of trust by failing to provide plaintiff 
with an adequate supply of drinking water.  Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s trust duties 
flowed from an executive order creating the Reservation (the “Executive Order of 1882”) 
and a subsequent Act of Congress incorporating the requirements of that Executive 
Order by reference (the “Act of 1958”).  According to plaintiff, by establishing the 
Reservation and holding the land in trust, the Executive Order of 1882 and the Act of 
1958 created a duty on the part of defendant to protect the trust property, including the 
Reservation’s water supply.  Plaintiff asserted that defendant breached this duty by 
failing to ensure that the arsenic level in the water supply complied with EPA standards.  
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
contending that plaintiff failed to identify a source of law creating a legally enforceable 
duty, requiring defendant to provide a certain quality of drinking water to the 
Reservation.             
According to defendant, neither the Executive Order of 1882 nor the Act of 1958 
imposes such a duty.  Defendant conceded that it held plaintiff’s water rights in trust but 
argues that this general trust relationship does not suffice to establish a specific trust 
duty to maintain water quality.  Defendant also argued that the sources of law plaintiff 
identified in its complaint cannot “fairly be interpreted” as mandating compensation.  
Finally, defendant averred that that Congress has provided a civil remedy for violations 
of the Safe Drinking Water Act and that the Court ought not interpret a statute or 
regulation to be money-mandating where, “Congress has provided an alternative 
remedy for the alleged wrongful conduct.”  The Court found that neither the Executive 
Order of 1882 nor the Act of 1958 expressly imposed a duty on defendant to protect the 
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quality of plaintiff’s water supply and that because the plaintiff failed to clear the first 
“hurdle” in establishing this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court need not consider whether any 
provision plaintiff cited can “fairly be interpreted” as mandating compensation.     
The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.   
104. Beattie v. Smith, No. 13–3053, 2013 WL 5995621 (10th Cir. 2013).  After 
being arrested at a resort operated by Native American tribe and charged with lewd and 
lascivious behavior and disorderly conduct, arrestee was tried and acquitted in state 
court, and subsequently brought civil rights action against the tribe, its Tribal Police 
Department, certain tribal police officers and resort security personnel, asserting claims 
under § 1983 and Kansas law.  The District Court granted tribal entities’ motion to 
dismiss and granted the individual defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
Arrestee appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the tribal police officers had 
probable cause to arrest; (2) the arrestee’s state law claim that officers’ investigation 
before arresting him was inadequate was barred by discretionary function exception of 
Kansas Tort Claims Act; (3) the allegation that security personnel caused officers to 
conduct an abbreviated investigation, leading to arrest, was insufficient to support claim 
for false arrest under Kansas law; (4) the allegation that security personnel “expressly 
requested [his] arrest” by officers was insufficient to support claim for false arrest 
against security personnel under Kansas law; and (5) the allegation that security 
personnel possessed information that tended to discredit the witness’s claim that she 
saw him masturbating in front of hotel window, but never requested that officers drop 
criminal case against him, was insufficient to support claim for malicious prosecution 
against security personnel under Kansas law.  Affirmed. 
105. Loya v. Gutierrez, No. 32,405, 2013 WL 6044354, 319 P.3d 656 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2013).  Arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a tribal police officer, alleging 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force.  Officer filed third-party 
declaratory judgment action against the county, alleging the county was required to 
defend and indemnify him.  The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
county.  Officer appealed.  The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the officer was not law 
enforcement officer under the Tort claims Act, and (2) the officer was not a public 
employee.  Affirmed. 
106. Wyandot Nation of Kansas v. United States, No. 06–919, 2014 WL 
1379106, 115 Fed. Cl. 595 (Fed. Cl. 2014).  Before the Court was the defendant's 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the 
Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims.  The government argued that the 
pendency of a previously filed case in a U.S. District Court precluded the Court’s 
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1500.  On December 28, 2006, plaintiff, Wyandot Nation 
of Kansas (Wyandot Nation), brought a claim in the Court of Federal Claims against the 
government.  Plaintiff sought money damages to compensate it for various breaches of 
fiduciary duty that it claimed the government committed as trustee of a trust holding 
assets for its benefit.  On December 30, 2005, before filing its action in the Court of 
Federal Claims, plaintiff filed a case in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia seeking relief for the government's alleged breach of fiduciary duty in 
connection with the same trust.  On July 13, 2006, the plaintiff filed an amended 
complaint in the District Court alleging defective trust accounting.  In the District Court, 
the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel a proper accounting and 
injunctive relief to compel proper management of its trust accounts.  Several months 
later, the plaintiff brought its claim against the United States for money damages in the 
Court of Federal Claims.  Plaintiff sought consequential damages, incidental damages, 
compound interest, pre-judgment interest, court costs, and attorneys' fees – all related 
to the defendant's breach of the fiduciary duties outlined above.  The Court concluded 
that the plaintiff's previously-filed district court complaint contained operative facts which 
substantially overlapped those of the above-captioned case and that § 1500 precluded 
the Court’s jurisdiction.  The Court granted the government's motion to dismiss.   
107. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty v. New York, No. 13–3069, 756 F.3d 163, 
2014 WL 2782191 (2d Cir. 2014).  An Indian tribe brought an action against the State of 
New York and certain state officials and agencies, counties, towns, and villages, 
alleging the tribe, and not the State, had title to 36 square mile tract of land in upstate 
New York.  The District Court, 2013 WL 3822093, granted the defendants’ motions to 
dismiss, and the tribe appealed.  The Appellate Court held that equitable principles of 
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility barred tribe’s claims.  Affirmed. 
108. Winnemucca Indian Colony v. United States, No. 13–874, 2014 WL 
3107445 (Fed. Cl. 2014).  Before the Court was an action for breach of trust brought by 
plaintiffs, Winnemucca Indian Colony and Chairman Willis Evans (the Colony).  
Defendant, the United States, (government) moved to dismiss the complaint.  In their 
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the United States has committed a breach of trust and a 
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with actions taken by the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs in failing to recognize the Colony’s tribal government and, inter alia, for 
allowing non-Colony members to occupy and use Colony land.  As a result of these 
alleged breaches, plaintiffs sought $108,000,000 and a declaratory judgment entitling 
the Colony to past, present, and future compensation, among other relief.  In August 
2011, the Winnemucca Colony filed a case against the United States in the United 
States District Court for the District of Nevada that raised similar claims.  The Court 
agreed with the government that § 1500 bars the Court from considering Counts One, 
Two, and Three of plaintiffs’ complaint and that Counts Three and Four also must be 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume III, Issue II - Spring 2015 
	  
	   505 
dismissed as seeking relief outside the jurisdiction of the court.  The government’s 
motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.   
N. Miscellaneous 
109. Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe v. St. Monica Dev., No. B238603, 2013 WL 
5976240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).  In 1994, the Gabrielino–Tongva people were recognized 
by the State of California as “the aboriginal tribe of the Los Angeles Basin.”  Currently in 
California there are several associations of descendants of this historic Native American 
tribe.  This appeal concerned two different groups of people claiming the right to control 
one such association, the Gabrielino–Tongva Tribe.  One of these two factions 
(appellant) initiated the lawsuit against defendants (respondents); the other tribal entity 
settled the claims against defendants.  Defendants moved for summary judgment based 
on that settlement.  The Trial Court determined there was no triable issue of material 
fact concerning the authority of the settling faction to act on behalf of the Tribe and 
entered judgment for defendants.  The Appellate Court determined there were triable 
issues of material fact preventing a summary disposition of the matter.  The Appellate 
Court reversed the judgment and the order granting respondents’ motion for summary 
judgment.   
110. W.I.H. ex rel. Heart v. Winner School Dist. 59-2, No. CIV 06–3007 
(D.S.D. 2014).  Plaintiffs instituted this action contending that the defendants punish 
Native American students more harshly and more frequently than similarly situated 
Caucasian students, that the defendant District maintains a racially hostile educational 
environment, and engages in racially discriminatory policies, customs, and practices.  
This matter was certified as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of the 
following class of plaintiffs:  All Native American students currently enrolled or who will 
in the future enroll in Winner Middle School or Winner High School.  Class counsel and 
counsel for the defendants filed a joint motion for approval of a settlement and proposed 
consent decree.  Notices of the proposed settlement and of a fairness hearing were 
given to the class members.  A consent decree was entered on December 10, 2007.  
Counsel filed a joint motion for approval of an amended consent decree.  Notices of the 
proposed amended consent decree and of a fairness hearing were given to the class 
members.  No objections were filed.  The original consent decree set forth a plan for 
developing and implementing certain “benchmarks,” i.e., programs or objectives 
designed to remedy the claimed hostile environment at the Winner Schools.  The 
original consent decree was to remain in effect until the defendants complied with all 
benchmarks for four consecutive school years, at which time the decree would 
automatically terminate.  The benchmark committee met in May and July of 2013, and 
determined that the benchmarks should be revised. The parties have agreed to amend 
the original consent decree to refer to “benchmarks” as “actions,” and “item goals” as 
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“outcome measures.”  The proposed amendment to the consent decree was 
contemplated by the original consent decree as part of continuing monitoring of the 
District's compliance and the parties desire to remedy the conditions existing at the time 
the class action was filed.  The amendments are consistent with the original consent 
decree's purpose.  The amended consent decree is fair, reasonable, and adequate to 
continue to redress the claims of current and future class members and is approved.   
111. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, Nos. 43451-2-II, 43751-1-
II, 2014 WL 2547601 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). Lender brought breach of contract action 
against borrowers for failure to pay promissory note based on a line of credit.  The 
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of lender in the amount of 
$161,831.97, but ruled that the borrower’s personal bank account containing proceeds 
from the sale of her Indian trust land were exempt from garnishment.  Lender appealed.  
The Appellate Court held that:  (1) the lender was judicially estopped from arguing on 
appeal that borrowers failed to prove the factual basis for their exemption, i.e., that the 
funds in the Native American borrower’s bank accounts derived from leases of Indian 
trust land; (2) the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether the 
statute excluded proceeds from the sale of Indian trust land, from liability for the 
payment of a debt that arose during the trust period, continued to protect any such 
moneys that had been placed in a Native American’s personal bank account; (3) the 
federal statute that provided that moneys from the lease or sale of Indian trust lands 
was not liable for certain debts provided protection against the garnishment of the 
money in the borrower’s bank accounts that had accrued from the lease of borrower’s 
Indian trust lands, regardless of whether the moneys accrued to an Individual Indian 
Money (IIM) account or directly to the Native American borrower; and (4) the lender was 
entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs incurred in responding to borrowers’ 
appeal.  Affirmed. 
112. Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., No. S–15056, 2014 WL 
3883431, 331 P.3d 384 (Alaska 2014). Arctic Slope Regional Corporation is an Alaska 
Native Regional Corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
and AS 10.06.960 and incorporated under the Alaska Corporations Code, AS 10.06.  At 
the time of trial, the Corporation took in about $2.5 billion in revenue each year, 
employed about 10,000 people, and had operations across the country and around the 
world.  The Corporation had about 11,000 shareholders in 2012, about 6,000 of whom 
were adults holding voting shares.  Rodney Peterson is an original shareholder of the 
Corporation, holding 100 Class A shares.  An attorney and a member of the Alaska bar, 
Pederson worked as assistant corporate counsel to the Corporation and later as an 
executive for one of the Corporation’s subsidiaries.  The employment relationship 
soured.  Pederson sought to exercise his statutory right to inspect books and records of 
account and minutes of board and committee meetings relating to executive 
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compensation and an alleged transfer of equity in corporate subsidiaries to executives.  
The Corporation claimed that the materials were confidential and sought to negotiate a 
confidentiality agreement prior to release of any documents.  This appeal presented 
several issues of first impression in Alaska.          
The court held that (1) the statutory phrase “books and records of account” 
includes electronically maintained books and records of account; (2) the statutory 
phrase also goes beyond mere annual reports and proxy statements; and (3) the 
statutory phrase at least encompasses monthly financial statements, records of 
receipts, disbursements and payments, accounting ledgers, and other financial 
accounting documents, including records of individual executive compensation and 
transfers of corporate assets or interests to executives.  The Court further held that (4) 
the statutory category “minutes” does not encompass all presentations or reports made 
to the board but rather merely requires a record of the items addressed and actions 
taken at the meeting, as have been faithfully recorded after the meeting.  Finally, the 
Court held that (5) a corporation may request a confidentiality agreement as a 
prerequisite to distributing otherwise-inspectable documents provided that the 
agreement reasonably defines the scope of confidential information subject to the 
agreement and contains confidentiality provisions that are not unreasonably restrictive 
in light of the shareholder’s proper purpose and the corporation’s legitimate 
confidentiality concerns. The Court concluded that the Corporation’s proffered 
confidentiality agreement in this case was not sufficiently tailored or limited in scope and 
thus Pederson’s refusal to sign it could not serve as a legal basis for avoiding liability for 
denying his inspection claims.  The Appellate Court reversed the Superior Court’s 
judgment, vacated the Superior Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
